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The purpose of this master thesis is find out what the resource-rich Ghana and Venezuela can 
learn from management of natural resources in Norway and Botswana. Previous studies show 
that institutions are an important determinant for the impact of the resource curse in resource 
dependent countries. By a comparative analysis, large differences in institutional quality are 
revealed. Transparency, accountability and a strong rule of law are found to be among the 
features that distinguish the successful countries. These differences translate into different 
economic policies. While Norway and Botswana have exhibited prudent fiscal management, 
government spending in Venezuela in particular, have been procyclical and unproductive. 
Although Ghana is lagging behind Norway and Botswana, the country should be able to avoid 
the resource curse if follows the path of the successes. Venezuela on the other hand, seems 
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“Men of a fat and fertile soil, are most commonly effeminate and cowards; whereas 
contrariwise a barren country make men temperate by necessity, and by consequence careful, 
vigilant, and industrious.” 
 















1.1.   Curse or blessing? 
 
Having an abundance of valuable resources like oil, natural gas and minerals is typically seen 
as a source of wealth and a blessing for countries. Petroleum in particular, creates enormous 
revenues. These revenues should be able to help countries overcome capital and foreign 
exchange constraints, and create a “push” to increase growth (Sachs and Warner, 1999). 
However, most resource-rich countries have experienced slower economic growth than 
economies without resource abundance like Korea and Hong Kong. While gold is often 
referred to as “black gold” it was also called “the devil’s excrement” by former Venezuelan 
Oil Minister and OPEC co-founder Pablo Perez Alfonso (Useem, 2003). This paradox is 
called the resource curse.  
 
Several empirical studies show an inverse relationship between natural resource abundance 
and economic growth. A study by Sachs and Warner (1995) show a negative effect of natural 
resource intensity on GDP growth during the years 1970-1990. The results from their cross-
country regression analysis remain significant after controlling for variables other studies 
have claimed to be important in explaining cross-country growth.  
 
UNCTAD data shows that per capita income in resource-poor countries grew two to three 
times faster than resource-rich countries between 1960 and 1990. The gap between growth 
rates increased after 1970 (Auty, 2001). Nigeria, Zambia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Saudi Arabia 
and Venezuela are examples of countries that have had an abundance of natural resources for 
several decades, but can be considered growth losers, while the resource-poor Asian Tigers; 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, have experienced incredible growth since the 
1960s.  
 
However, some countries have had great economic growth despite their resource abundance.  
Norway is one of the most prominent examples of countries that seem to have been able to 
avoid the resource curve. While Norway’s exports are dominated by the petroleum sector, 
Botswana is one of the largest producers of diamond in the world. Statistics from UNCTAD 
(n.d.) shows both these countries have achieved high, stable growth rates for decades. 
Venezuela on the other hand, has had almost no economic growth since 1970, despite sitting 
on the world’s largest proven petroleum reserves. Ghana is another interesting example as it 
has been known for fertile lands and mineral endowments but has struggled to develop the 
economy. The economy has been growing rapidly the last years, but the country recently 
discovered oil in commercial quantities, and must carefully avoid the resource curse to ensure 
sustainable economic growth. Will the oil discovery turn out to be a blessing or a curse? Can 
the resource management of Norway and Botswana show possible solutions to the challenges 
Ghana and Venezuela are facing? 
 
According to Wiig and Kolstad (2009), three main mechanisms behind the resource curse 
have been given most attention in previous research. The impact of these mechanisms is 
related to the quality of institutions in the country. Dutch decease refers to problems similar to 
those of the Netherlands during the 1970s. High profitability in the natural resource sector 
leads to high demand, which pushes up wages and appreciates the exchange rate. This reduces 
competitiveness in the non-resource sector, which slows growth. Secondly, economic rents 
from the natural resource sector increase both incentives and ability for the government to 
secure their power through patronage, and pursue self-enrichment instead of activities that 
increase the productive potential of the economy. The third mechanism behind the resource 




1.2.   Research questions 
 
Even though many countries seem cursed by their natural resource abundance, the success of 
for instance Norway and Botswana implies that the curse is avoidable. How countries should 
address the issues related to the resource curse has become an important topic. Escaping the 
resource curse is crucial in order to achieve economic growth and prosperity for many 
developing counties. This master thesis seeks to answer the following question:  
 
What can Ghana and Venezuela learn from the management of natural resource revenues 
in Norway and Botswana in order to avoid the resource curse?  
 
Relevant research questions that need to be answered in order to find solutions to this problem 
are: 
 
- How do institutions in Ghana and Venezuela differ from Norway and Botswana? 
- How do the countries differ in terms of economic policies? 
- Which of the economic policies that have been successfully implemented in Norway 
and Botswana should Ghana and Venezuela adopt in order to escape the resource 
curse? 
- Are other economic policies, social or political reforms needed to avoid the resource 
curse in these countries? 
 
By comparing these countries to Norway and Botswana; countries that have successfully 
managed their natural resources, the paper aims to find possible ways to achieve sustainable 
economic growth. The challenges Ghana and Venezuela are facing are in many ways 
different, but they all originate from a vast amount of natural resources. This master thesis 




1.3.   Structure of the work 
 
Using an exploratory comparative analysis, this paper begins with a brief contextual overview 
that describes the natural resource sectors in Norway, Botswana, Ghana and Venezuela, and 
their individual economic developments since 1970. This chapter shows the different impact 
of resource abundance. Chapter 3 provides insight in literature describing institutions and 
policies that correlate with the outcome of resource abundance, and how equilibrium forces in 
countries with weak institutions make reforms difficult to implement successfully. Kolstad 
and Wiig (2009) present the main framework around the resource curse mechanisms, and 
various political economy studies describe the impact and characteristics of institutional 
quality. Different economic policies advocated to resource dependent countries are then 
described.  
 
The methodology used in this thesis is presented after the theoretical framework, in chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 seeks to answer the research questions in light of the literature study. The 
differences and similarities between institutions in both the successful countries and the 
countries vulnerable to the resource curse will be analyzed. The economic policies these 
countries have pursued will then be analyzed in a similar way. Possible lessons Ghana and 






















This chapter briefly presents the natural resource sectors in Norway, Botswana, Ghana and 
Venezuela, and the economic developments since 1970 in the respective countries. The 
different experiences of resource wealth in each country provide a foundation for the 
theoretical review and comparative analysis, which seek to find recommendations for the 
vulnerable countries. 
 
In literature on the topic, including Stevens (2003) and Torvik (2009), Norway and Botswana 
are often hailed as examples of resource-rich countries that have achieved high, sustainable 
growth rates by managing their natural resources well. The similar experiences of these 
countries suggest that countries in different stages of development can avoid the resource 
curse, and that the curse is not dependent on geographical or regional features. While Norway 
was already a developed economy upon the discovery of oil, Botswana was among the 
poorest countries in the world when its diamonds endowments were found (Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson, 2002). The achievements of these countries must be caused by some 
other variables, which this thesis aims to explore. 
 
Venezuela and Ghana have one trait in common with Norway and Botswana: They are both 
resource-rich. Otherwise they are different in many ways. Ghana, formerly known as the Gold 
Coast, has by far lowest GDP per capita of the countries analyzed, despite its long history of 
gold and cocoa exportation. It has recently discovered oil, which makes the resource curse 
particularly relevant. Venezuela has the largest proven crude oil reserves in the world (OPEC, 
2013), but is often quoted as an example of failure to manage resource wealth.  
 
These four resource-rich countries represent a wide range of variables that may affect the 
impact of a resource. By comparing contrasting cases, the robustness of any findings of 
policies and institutional features that separate the vulnerable countries; Ghana and 
Venezuela, from the countries that have managed to escape the curse; Norway and Botswana, 
will increase.  
2.1.   Norway 
 
Compared to other industrialized countries, the economic growth in Norway has been very 
high. In 1970 the GDP per capita measured in purchasing power parities was 5 percent below 
the OECD average. By 2010 it was 70 percent above the average (Holden, 2013). Larsen 
(2005) compares Norway to its Scandinavian neighbors Sweden and Denmark. It had been the 
poorest of the countries for centuries, but this trend started to turn in the early 1970s. By 
2000, the country had the largest GDP per capita in Scandinavia. Norway’s accelerated 
growth from the 1970s coincided with the discovery of oil. 
 
Petroleum exploration in Norway was led by Phillips Petroleum during the 1960s. The 
Norwegian government however, claimed sovereignty over the Norwegian continental shelf. 
Regulations from 1963 determine that “the right to submarine natural resources is vested in 
the State” and that the government would have to authorize licenses for exploration and 
exploitation of these resources (LOV-1963-06-21-12). According to the Norwegian Ministry 
of Petroleum and Energy (2013) geological expertise was negative towards the existence of 
oil and natural gas deposits on the Norwegian continental shelf, but there was great 
enthusiasm following the discovery of natural gas in the Netherlands in 1959. The 
explorations proved successful. In 1969 the offshore Ekofisk field was discovered and oil 
production started two years later. During the next years several new offshore discoveries 
were made. Phillips Petroleum and other foreign companies dominated the exploration and 
development of the first oil and gas fields in Norway (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy, 2013). Holden (2013) finds a gradual increase of domestic participation however. 
During the 1970s, the Norwegian involvement grew through the state owned Statoil, and the 
private companies Hydro and Saga. 
 
Today, Norway is the largest oil producer and exporter in Europe, and the world’s second 
largest natural gas exporter (U.S Energy Information Administration [EIA], 2012a). 
Preliminary figures of the annual national account for 2013 show that value added from oil 
and gas extraction including services currently accounts for about 21.5 percent of Norway’s 
GDP, down from approximately 23 percent in 2012 (Statistics Norway, 2013). Data for 2012 
from the World Bank (n.d.a) show that Norway has the fourth highest nominal GDP per 
capita in the world at 99,558 U.S. dollars, and also the fourth highest GDP per capita at 
purchasing power parity at 65,640 current international dollars (n.d.b). The economic 
achievements of Norway are underlined by the Human Development Report 2013 (United 
Nations Development Programme, 2013). Norway consistently tops the Human Development 




2.2.   Botswana 
 
Another example of a resource-rich country that has experienced high economic growth rates 
in the same time period is Botswana. Botswana is a small country to the north of South-Africa 
with a population of only 2 million, yet the largest diamond producer in the world by value. 
According to Acemoglu et al. (2002) Botswana had the highest economic growth in the world 
between 1965 and 1998, even surpassing the mentioned Asian Tigers.  
 
Botswana was a British colony until its independence in 1966. The country’s situation in 1966 
differs from Norway in many ways. It was the second poorest country in the world, next to 
Bangladesh (Manatsha and Maharjan, 2009). Conditions were not considered favorable for 
economic growth according previous studies (e.g Bloom and Sachs, 1998). Botswana is 
tropical/subtropical and landlocked, situated in a region with a long history of conflicts and 
poverty. The main sector was agriculture, mostly cattle ranching. Because of the dry climate 
however, agricultural conditions were poor as well, so Botswana had to import food at a value 
of approximately 10 percent of GDP. There was little infrastructure, or other assets. Only 12 
km of paved road existed, just 22 Batswana had graduated from university and 100 from 
secondary school. The country relied heavily on foreign aid. In 1966, 50 percent of 
government expenditure was paid for by Britain (Acemoglu et al., 2002).  
 
Two years before Norway discovered oil, in 1967, geologists from the diamond company De 
Beers found diamonds in Botswana. The government of Botswana and De Beers Consolidated 
Mines Ltd formed the joint venture partnership Debswana Diamond Company (Pty) Ltd in 
1978, which owns the four diamond mines operating in Botswana. The Debswana mines 
include Orapa, the largest diamond mine in the world and Jwaneng, the world’s richest mine 
by diamond value (“History and Profile”, n.d.). The company is the largest private employer 
in the country, and produces more than 70 percent of Botswana’s export revenues and 30 
percent of GDP (“Introduction”, n.d.). 
 
After rapid diamond-led growth, Botswana was classified as an upper-middle economy by 
1998. Nominal GDP per capita was up to 7,238 U.S. dollars in 2012 (The World Bank, n.d.a) 
and 16,321 current international dollars adjusted for purchasing parities (The World Bank, 
n.d.b). According to Mehlum et al. (2006) the mining sector has consistently contributed to 
around 40 percent of GDP since 1980. The annual reports from Bank of Botswana (2001, 
2013), show that agriculture and manufacturing have remained almost negligible in 
comparison. There has been a large slump in demand for diamonds after the financial crisis 
however. Mineral production, mostly diamonds, fell by almost 50 percent in 2009 and 
contribution to GDP was down to 19.6 percent in 2012. Growth in non-resource sectors has 
somewhat counteracted the effects of the decline in mineral exports Real GDP per capita have 
been growing recent years, although slower than the past three decades (Bank of Botswana, 
2013). Compared to the situation in 1966, infrastructure, education and healthcare have 
improved dramatically. However, because the country suffers from the second highest 
HIV/aids prevalence in the world, education and health outcomes are still below other 
countries in the upper-middle income group (Acemogu et al., 2002). 
 
 
2.3.   Ghana 
 
Ghana is a West-African country with a population of 25 million people. In 2007 oil was 
discovered in commercial quantities off the Ghanaian coastline, and the resource curse debate 
became increasingly relevant. Ghana is not a newly resource abundant country however, it has 
been known for its resource-richness for centuries, especially gold. Portuguese sailor 
discovered Ghana in 1471, and the area became known as the Gold Coast. The Gold Coast 
supplied European traders with gold and slaves, and became part of the British Empire in the 
19
th
 century (Government of Ghana, 2013). 
 
In 1957 Ghana became the first African colony to gain independence from Britain. As 
opposed to Botswana, Meredith (2005) describes Ghana as one of the richest tropical 
countries in the world at the time of independence. Ghana was the world’s leading producer 
of cocoa, it had large foreign currency reserves, and also possessed an abundance of timber, 
gold and other minerals. Initial conditions were much more favorable for economic growth 
than in its African counterpart Botswana.    
 
Ghana has been at peace since independence in 1957, but there were several military coups 
during the 1970’s. In the same period, the Ghanaian economy fell into a depression 
(Kermeliotis, 2014). UNCTAD data (n.d.) shows that real GDP per capita fell by more than 2 
percent per year on average. Since the mid 1980’s economic growth in Ghana has been 
relatively high compared to neighboring West-African countries, and growth rates have been 
increasing. Despite its resource abundance, Ghana still remains a poor country. Nominal GDP 
per capita was only 1,605 U.S. dollars in 2012 (The World Bank, n.d.a), and 2,014 current 
international dollars adjusted for purchasing parities (n.d.b). Granado and Daal (2014) note 
that about a quarter of the population lives below the poverty line, and businesses lack access 
to affordable credit and reliable electricity supply. 
 
The oil field discovered in 2007 in western Ghana, has been named Jubilee, because it was 
discovered around the same time as the country was celebrating its 50 years of independence. 
The proven reserves are significant, but not high compared to the largest oil producing 
countries. Production started in December 2010, and Jubilee is expected to fuel the Ghanaian 
economy for the next 20 years (Kuzu and Nantogmah, 2010). Estimates suggest that the 
reserves from the Jubilee field will add about 6 to7 percent to GDP over the next 5 to 10 years 
of production and then decline over the next decade. Production estimates may increase as 
new discoveries are being announced (Aydin, 2011). Data from Ghana Statistical Service 
(2013) show that crude oil production contributed to 6.8 percent of GDP in 2012. This is more 
than the combined production from gold and cocoa, the two major sectors of the economy for 
the last 100 years (Moss and Young, 2009).  
 
According to Kuzu and Nantogmah (2010), initial reactions to the discovery of oil were 
euphoric. The now diseased president Kufour held a press conference with a glass of 
champagne in one hand, and a glass of crude oil in the other. He described oil as a “shot in the 
arm”, and claimed that Ghana would emerge as an “African Tiger” within five years.  
 
There are still some concerns about Ghana’s ability to benefit from the newly discovered oil-
fields however. Several sources, including Agbele (2011), Amundsen (2012) and Borowski 
(2013), claim there are clear signs of corruption in Ghana. Skepticism also hails from the 
country’s long history of gold mining, which has not been able to transform the Ghanaian 
economy (Kuzu and Nantogmah, 2010). According to Obeng-Odoom (2010, p. 108) the 
majority of people in many gold mining towns are homeless, unemployed and poor, and “the 
environmental impact has been devastating”.  
 
 
2.4.   Venezuela 
 
While Ghana struggles to avoid the resource curse, it has experienced positive economic 
developments in recent years, sustainable or not. The fourth country to be analyzed however, 
Venezuela, has not been able to take advantage of its vast natural resources. In an interview 
with Harvard Business Review, Professor Francisco Monaldi claims that “Venezuela is the 
textbook case of the worst economic policies if you want to avoid the resource curse” (Green, 
2013). 
 
 The OPEC member officially named República Bolivariana de Venezuela is a South 
American country with a population close to 30 million. This relatively small, tropical State 
has the largest proven petroleum resources in the world (OPEC, 2013). Most of these reserves 
are located in or near the Caribbean Sea; in the Gulf of Venezuela, Lake Maracaibo and the 
Orinoco River basin.  
 
As Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 show, GDP have declined for decades before a small growth 
spurt recent years. In 1949 Venezuela’s GDP per capita was higher than in countries like 
West Germany, Italy and Japan (Rossi, 2011). Compared to the situation today, it seems 
obvious that Venezuela is one of the clearest examples of failure to manage resource 
abundance. Rodriguez, Morales and Monaldi (2012, p. 1) describe Venezuela as a “textbook 
case of a resource dependent country”. They argue that weak institutions, particularly rule of 
law and control of corruption, allow for wasteful spending and oppressive governments.  
 
According to Rodriguez et al. the country was hailed a success story with a robust economy 
between 1935 and 1978, and from 1958 a stable democracy as well. From 1978 however, a 
prolonged economic depression started, and poverty and inequality increased. This led to the 
election of political outsider Hugo Chaves in 1998, and the socialistic “Bolivarian 
Revolution”. In the last decade, Venezuela, like many other oil exporting countries, has 
enjoyed high revenues from the great increase in oil prices. Economic and social policies have 
however, increased Venezuela’s dependency on oil, and Rossi (2011) argue that the recent 
GDP growth is not sustainable.  
 
While Chavez’s government has received a lot of criticism, the reforms have brought some 
positive changes. The government has managed to reduce poverty and health services (Rossi, 
2011), and income inequality, measure by the Gini coefficient index, is now the lowest in 
Latin America (Plummer, 2012). 
 
Nominal GDP per capita was 12,729 U.S. dollars in 2012 (The World Bank, n.d.a), and 
13,267 current international dollars adjusted for purchasing parities (n.d.b). The petroleum 
sector accounted for around 25 percent of GDP (OPEC, n.d.). Data from The World Bank 
(n.d.c) show that 50 percent of fiscal revenues and 96 percent of export value came from 
petroleum production. The petroleum sector accounted for around 25 percent of GDP (OPEC, 
n.d.). Despite high revenues due to unusually high oil prices, fiscal deficits have been large, 
public debt has risen sharply (Rossi, 2011). Rossi further notes that Chavez has not been able 
to increase the productive potential of the economy.  These findings will be discussed in 
chapter 5. 
 
As mentioned, Venezuela sits on the largest proven crude oil reserves in the world, 20 percent 
of the world’s total reserves, yet it is only the ninth largest exporter (OPEC, 2013). Rodriguez 
et al., (2012) find that oil exports have decreased by around 50 percent since 1997 by volume, 
but that the impact on revenues has been more than offset by the oil price boom. If production 
stays at current levels it would take more than 270 years before Venezuela runs out of oil. The 
majority of the oil is located in the Orinoco River basin, known as the Orinoco Oil Belt. Oil 
found in this area is extra-heavy, which is difficult and expensive to extract. At current prices 
and estimates for the foreseeable future, increased exploitation of these resources is still 
economically viable, but production has been held back by lack of investment. Furthermore, 
liquid fuels are heavily subsidized in Venezuela. The Venezuelan gasoline prices are the 
lowest in the world, averaging 2.1 U.S. cents per liter in 2011. Accordingly, an increasing 
share of oil production is now being consumed domestically instead of being sold to foreign 
markets. 
2.5.   GDP growth rates 
 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the historical growth of the economies analyzed in this thesis. 
 
 
Figure 1. Adapted from Real GDP growth rates, per capita, annual, by UNCTAD, n.d., 
retrieved from http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ 
 
 
Figure 2. Adapted from GDP per capita, PPP (Constant 2005 international dollars), by The 
World Bank, n.d., retrieved from data.worldbank.org/ 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the average growth rates for both developed and developing economies, as 
well as growth rates for the five countries analyzed in this thesis. The reason for including 
these variables is the different growth rates shown by developed and developing countries the 
last decades. The data from UNCTAD show that growth rates in developed countries have 
slowed down considerably during this timeframe, while developing economies are catching 
up in terms of GDP per capita. The developed economy in this comparison; Norway, has seen 
declining growth rates recent years, yet growth has been higher than the average of developed 
economies. Ghana on the other hand, a developing economy, has experienced increasing 
growth rates, but lower than other developing economies. 
 
Figure 2 uses GDP in purchasing power parities (PPP). GDP is converted to international 
dollars, which adjust GDP for differences in domestic price levels. GDP in (PPP) is a better 
measurement for cross-country analysis than nominal or real GDP. Constant terms are used to 
better show economic development over time. Data for GDP in PPP is not available from the 















Avoiding the resource curse 
 
 
3.1.   Empirical evidence 
 
Several studies show an inverse relationship between natural resource abundance and 
economic growth instead of “the big push” one would logically expect. Most literature on the 
resource curse phenomenon refer to Sachs and Warner (1995), who show a negative effect of 
natural resource intensity on GDP growth during the years 1970-1990. The results from their 
cross-country regression analysis remain significant after controlling for variables other 
studies have claimed to be important in explaining cross-country growth. These control 
variables include level of initial GDP in the countries analyzed, their openness policy, 
investment rates, human capital accumulation rates, changes in the external terms of trade, 
government expenditure ratios, terms of trade volatility, and the efficiency of government 
institutions. 
 
Manzano and Rigobon (2001) find similar results in their study. The relationship between 
exports of primary products as a share of GDP and economic growth is slightly negative, but 
the findings are not conclusive. They find almost as many successful resource-rich countries 
as failures, and the signs of a resource curse disappear when controlled for debt overhang 
incurred while commodity prices were high during the 1970s. There is certainly no positive 
correlation between resources and growth, or “blessing” found however. 
 
According to Warner (2013) there is a “lively debate about whether the natural-resource curse 
still exists”. Many resource-rich countries have experienced high growth rates recent years, 
including Ghana and Venezuela. Warner argues however, that these numbers are distorted by 
the resource price boom. Although GDP has increased, the growth rates in non-resource 
sectors are much lower. He claims that growth in non-resource sectors is a better 
measurement of the economy’s ability to achieve sustainable growth. 
 
 
3.2.   Important definitions 
 
There seem to be broad consensus among scholars that so-called resource curse is a real 
concern for resource-rich economies. The mechanisms behind the curse are heavily debated 
however. Some important definitions will be shortly discussed before moving into this topic. 
 
3.2.1. Natural resource abundance 
Most empirical studies have defined natural resource abundance as export of primary exports 
as a share of GDP (Brunnschweiler, 2008), including Sachs and Warner (1995). There are 
logical reasons to criticize this definition however. Stijns (2005) substitute export shares with 
natural resource reserves and production data, and finds no evidence of a resource curse. 
Brunnschweiler (2008) defines natural resource abundance, or resource wealth, by an 
estimation of the net present value of future resource rents per capita. With this measurement 
she finds a positive relationship between resource abundance and economic growth. 
Brunnschweiler argues that there is not a strong correlation between natural resource 
abundance and the intensity resource exports. Australia and Germany are mentioned as 
examples of resource-rich countries with relatively low resource exports. A high level primary 
exports can therefore be an indication of resource dependency or lack of diversification, 
instead. This topic will not be discussed further in the thesis because Norway, Botswana, 
Ghana and Venezuela can be described as resource-rich countries defined from either 
definitions; export shares, production, reserves and net present value of resource rents. 
 
Several studies, including Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett and Busby (2005) distinguish between 
point source resources and diffuse resources. Point source resources are resources that are 
extracted from geographically concentrated location and provide revenue that is easy to 
control and capture, like petroleum and hard minerals. Diffuse resources are resources which 
are less concentrated like agricultural products and fish. Except for Ghana’s relatively large 
cocoa industry, all the countries compared in this cross-country analysis are specializing in 
point source resources. When referring to resources, point-source resources are implied. 
 
3.2.2. Rents 
Economic rents are earnings in excess of relevant cost, including normal return on capital. 
Basic economic theory states that rents are zero in perfectly competitive markets, but in 
natural resource industries, especially oil in recent years, these rents have been large because 
of high market prices. These high prices are a result of limited supply both in nature and from 
artificially low production due to cartels like OPEC. 
 
3.2.3. Institutions 
The term “institutions” can be defined as rules of the game, or constraints that structure 
human interaction.  Institutions are both formal and informal rules of behavior, as well as 
ways and means of enforcing these rules (North 1990). Aoki (2007) describes institutions as 
the equilibrium outcome which arises through repeated interactions between agents. Examples 
of measures of institutional quality are many; the rule of law, transparency and accountability, 
trust and economic policies. This thesis will distinguish between the concept of institutions 
and economic policies that directly address the issues related to the resource curse, even if the 
two are interrelated. Research suggests that institutions affect the ability of countries to avoid 
the resource curse. Studies on this relationship and characteristics of strong institutions will be 
described in chapter 3.4. 
 
 
3.3.   The resource curse mechanisms 
 
Initial research, most notably Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999, 2001) generally pointed to 
macroeconomic transmission mechanisms, more specifically the Dutch Disease, as the main 
mechanism behind the negative effects of resource abundance on growth (Stevens and 
Dietsche 2008). Later studies, including Robinson, Torvik and Verdier (2006), Mehlum, 
Moene and Torvik (2006), Stevens and Dietsche (2008) and Kolstad and Wiig (2009), have 
focused more on the political economy models. Kolstad and Wiig even criticize the work of 
Sachs and Warner for putting later empirical studies “on the wrong track”. They argue that the 
resource curse is not necessarily about resource abundance, but the economic rents created by 
exploitation of natural resources. 
 
Kolstad and Wiig summarize the three mechanisms that have received the most attention in 




Figure 3.  Resource curse mechanisms. Reprinted from “It’s the rents, stupid! The political 




3.3.1. Dutch Disease 
The name “Dutch Disease” originates from the problems experienced by the Netherlands 
during the 1970s. The Netherlands experienced a recession after the discovery of large natural 
gas deposits in the North Sea. The Dutch Disease models focus on lost competitiveness in 
non-resource sectors – manufacturing being the most significant in developed economies, like 
in the Netherlands during the 1970s. High demand in the resource sector inflates wages and 
the currency appreciates. In turn, this cause sectors not affected by the increased demand to 
lose competitiveness in international markets. The contraction of non-resource sectors causes 
productivity loss that slows down economic growth. Sachs and Warner (2001) use the 
expression “crowding-out logic”. If activity X drives growth, growth suffers if natural 
resources crowd-out activity X. Crowding-out happens because profits are reduced from 
higher input prices. Sachs and Warner identify X as traded manufacturing activities. 
 
3.3.2. Centralized- and decentralized political economy models 
The centralized- and decentralized political economy models from Kolstad and Wiig’s 
framework are based on the assumption that rents are the source of the resource curse. 
Political economy models argue that resource rents cause inefficiency and dysfunctional 
behavior in countries with weak institutions.  
 
While the Dutch Disease model focuses on a shift in demand from investors, the centralized 
political economy model analyzes the incentives and constraints of the government. The key 
problem in centralized political economy models is recognized as patronage (Kolstad and 
Wiig, 2009). Caselli and Cunningham (2007) argue that resource revenues can be spent on 
enrichment of the political elite, activities that preserve the power of the political elite, and 
investments that can increase non-resource income and the productive potential of the 
economy. A growth in natural resource rents both increases the value of staying in power and 
creates stronger challenge for power from the opposition. They claim that the effect of natural 
resources is ambiguous. The government can secure its position in power in both productive 
and unproductive ways. The potentially productive method is to increase support through 
investments and effective policies. However, the government can also enhance its likelihood 
to stay in power through patronage, e.g. by allocating jobs and investments to political 
supporters, which leads to inefficiencies. An increased challenge for power can also cause 
both detrimental and potentially productive responses from the political elite. A potentially 
productive method is to give political opponents valuable outside options by spending 
resources to raise profitability in the private sector. The economically detrimental response is 
to spend resources fighting the opposition through armed conflicts, repression and by buying 
off opponents. Furthermore, natural resource wealth tends to inhibit democratic development 
because the resource rents help regimes conserve their power (Stevens and Dietsche, 2008; 
Frankel, 2010).  
 
Decentralized political economy models analyze the incentives of private agents. The key 
problem in decentralized models is recognized as rent seeking; individuals outside the 
political elite choose to compete for rent extracting activities instead of productive work or 
entrepreneurship. Rent seeking can turn natural resources into a curse if there are increasing 
returns to scale in the productive non-resource sectors or if rent seeking has direct negative 
spillover effects on productivity (Caselli and Cunningham, 2007).  
 
3.3.3. Other remarks 
A final trait of resource-rich economies not easily fitted into the framework of Kolstad and 
Wiig is vulnerability caused by high commodity price volatility. Countries of natural resource 
wealth are particularly prone to “boom and bust cycles” (Frankel, 2010). 
 
Most studies claim that the resource curse is not inevitable. Both studies focusing on the 
macroeconomic mechanisms and political economy models stress that proper management 
can contain the problems (Larsen, 2004). Institutions and economic policies that can facilitate 




3.4.   Institutional quality 
 
3.4.1. The impact of institutions 
Cross-country regressions by Mehlum et al. (2006) show the effect of institutional quality on 
average GDP growth from 1965-1990. Figure 4 shows the growth rates of 42 countries that 
had more than 10% of their GDP as resource exports during this period. Figure (b) are the 
countries with the best institutions, and (c) are the countries with the worst institutions. 
Countries with bad institutions performed worse and the most resource dependent countries in 
this group showed particularly low growth rates. They conclude that their “main finding is 
that the resource curse applies in countries with grabber friendly institutions but not in 
countries with producer friendly institutions”. 
 
Mehlum et al. (2006) define producer friendly institutions as institutions that attract 
entrepreneurs into production. Grabber friendly institutions are institutions that make it 
attractive for entrepreneurs to shift from productive activities to unproductive influence 
activities – rent-seeking. Grabbers use all their capacity to exploit as much rents as possible 
from natural resources. Examples of weak institutions are weak property and contractual 
rights, malfunctioning bureaucracy and low corruption control. With producer friendly 
institutions rent-seeking and production are complementary activities, while with grabber 
friendly institutions these are competing activities and therefore detrimental to economic 
growth 
 
Kolstad and Wiig (2009) introduce the term impartially enhancing institutions. Good 
institutions that are able to lift the resource curse mechanisms are institutions that are 
impartial. Weak institutions are partial, and they typically benefit the elite, while they are the 
negatively affecting sustainable economic growth and the rest of the population. The problem 
of institutional change is that those who benefit from the partially enhancing institution often 
are in a position to resist the change. Government officials in countries with weak institutions 
will for instance be unwilling to reduce their opportunities to secure wealth and powerful 
positions through patronage and corruption.  Minor institutional reforms will not be 
sustainable because elites have incentives to reverse the changes. Kolstad and Wiig sum it up 
by saying that institutions must be changed in a way that aligns the interest of the government 
with the population, and that gives entrepreneurs incentives to behave socially optimal. 
 
Acemoglu and Robinson (1999) emphasize the importance of the rule of law and property 
rights. A strong rule of law can be characterized by a high level of confidence in protection by 
the police force, and fair and competent courts. Without secure property rights and 
mechanisms that constrain abuse from either the State or civilians, there is less incentive to 
engage in productive activities. It is also easier to control markets to create ineffective 
monopolies and pursue rent seeking. 
 
If institutional quality has a significant impact on the economic developments of resource-rich 
countries, what policies or reforms should be adopted to escape the resource curse?  
 
 
Figure 4.  Resources and Institutions (a) all resource rich countries (b) with bad institutions 
(c) with good institutions. Reprinted from “Institutions and the Resource Curse” by H. 




3.4.2. System of government 
The system of government or constitutional design can be seen as the foundation for a 
country’s institutions. They define the “formal rules of the political game” (Andersen and 
Aslaksen, 2008, p. 4). As previously mentioned, resource rents help authoritarian regimes 
conserve their power. Stevens and Dietsche (2007) argue that the natural resource revenue 
allows governments to “diffuse pressure to democratize”. According to Frankel however, 
there is not good evidence that democracy directly leads to economic growth. 
 
A cross-country study of 90 countries by Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) investigate if the 
system of governance determines how natural resource abundance influences economic 
growth. They find that constitutions do not affect growth directly, but there is a negative 
interaction with resource abundance.  According to the study, presidential and nondemocratic 
regimes suffer from the resource curse, while parliamentary democracies do not. Democracies 
perform better than authoritarian regimes, but the particular form of democracy has even 
higher importance. Andersen and Aslaksen explain their findings with the assertion that 
presidential regimes pursue policies inferior in terms of promoting growth compared to 
parliamentary regimes. This assertion is based on recent theoretical contributions in the 
political economy literature. Presidential governments seem to favor powerful minorities at 
the expense of broad investments because they are not being constrained by a confidence 
requirement from the congress to remain in power (Persson and Tabellini, 2003). The 
electoral rules also have an impact on the incentives and constraints faced by politicians. 
Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman (2005) argue that corruption is lower under majority rule than 
under proportional rule because proportional representation makes it more difficult for voters 
and the opposition to hold and corrupt individuals accountable. Their empiric study shows a 
positive correlation between proportional representation systems and corruption. Corruption is 
especially high when proportional representation is combined with presidential regimes. 
 
Eifert, Gelb and Tallroth (2002) provide a different perspective. They analyze different type 
of rentier states – states that live off profits from resource exploitation rather than the surplus 
production of the population (Karl, 2007). The study separates rentier states into five 
categories: “mature democracies”, “factional democracies”, “paternalistic autocracies”, 
reformist autocracies” and “predatory autocracies. The institutional features in these rentier 
states differ in terms of; the length of political horizons, the level of transparency, policy 
stability and quality, the political power of non-resource sectors and  the power of interests 
that are directly involved in state spending. The different institutional features of these rentier 
states determine the capacity to address the challenges caused by natural resource abundance.  
 
Eifert et al. (2002) argue that mature democracies and reformist autocracies are best suited to 
address these policy challenges. Mature democracies, like Norway, benefit from stable party 
systems, high level of social consensus, competent and independent bureaucracies and judicial 
systems and often highly educated electorates. Political stability and institutional 
accountability give politicians incentives to long term policy horizons because party 
reputation and economic performance are important in order to compete for political power. 
Policy regimes are usually based on transparent information and a change of government will 
rarely lead to drastic policy alterations. Because political competition is partly based on 
economic performance, there are incentives to allocate investments and public goods in ways 
that complement the productivity of the private sector. The features of mature democracies 
give citizens opportunities to influence government spending and keep excessive government 
consumption, patronage and rent seeking to a minimum. 
 
Reformist autocracies are preferred because of their stable governments, broad social 
consensus and competent and independent technocratic elites. This type of rentier state lack 
the democratic representation and transparency of the mature democracies but seek to 
generate legitimacy through policies that reduce poverty and facilitate economic growth. This 
ensures a long term policy horizon where competent and politically independent technocrats 
are given important positions. The closed political system and lack of transparency create 
incentives to patronage and rent seeking activities but Eifert et al. claim that these incentives 
are constrained by the political mandate to make real social and economic improvements. 
They find that reformist autocracies often use resource revenues productively to stimulate 
diversification and growth. Indonesia under the Suharto government is referred to a typical 
reformist autocracy. Major economic developments began when Suharto came to power in 
1967. A team of economic advisors known as the “Berkley Mafia” proved to have “both 
exceptional influence and continuity” (p. 24). Eifert et al., further note that the non-oil 
tradeables, agriculture and increasingly labor-intensive industry  “constituted a major political 
interest group with a direct concern for the quality of public spending as well as for avoiding 
extreme appreciation of the real exchange rate” (p. 25). 
  
 
Factional democracies, paternalistic autocracies and predatory autocracies have greater 
weaknesses related to the resource curse than the rentier states above. The type of states that 
are most likely to experience the curse of natural resources are predatory autocracies. 
Predatory autocracies are characterized by an unstable political environment, often 
legitimized by military force. The regimes are “kleptocratic” with very high government 
consumption, rent seeking, patronage and corruption. One of the most obvious examples of 
predatory autocracies is Nigeria. Nigeria is one of the largest oil producers in the world, yet it 
remains one of the poorest. 
 
3.4.3. Transparency and accountability 
An adequate level of transparency and accountability is an important criterion for well-
functioning institutions. In many resource-rich countries corruption is a key issue in the form 
of rent seeking and patronage as explained earlier. Corruption is defined as misuse of public 
power or resources for private gain (Karl, 2007). Lack of transparency creates an agency 
problem where agents are allowed to behave opportunistically because of asymmetric 
information. Transparent environments ensure that resource revenues are utilized productively 
rather than to be exploited by powerful, corrupt agents. Kolstad and Wiig (2008) also argue 
that information failure undermines cooperation and trust. Lack of information increases 
transaction costs because it will be more challenging to form and maintain cooperative 
agreements. According to political economy literature, i.e. Eifert et al. (2002), democratic 
governments are more transparent. However transparency can also be seen as a prerequisite to 
democratic developments. Without well informed citizens, real democratic representation is 
impossible.  
 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is one of several global projects that 
seek to improve transparency in resource-rich countries (Kolstad and Wiig, 2008). EITI stress 
the importance of transparency in a publication from the UK Department of International 
Development (2004, p. 2-3): 
 
“Increasing transparency and knowledge of revenues will empower citizens and institutions to 
hold governments to account. Mismanagement or diversion of funds away from sustainable 
development purposes will become more difficult. It should also benefit developing and 
transition economies by improving the business environment, helping them to attract foreign 
direct investment. Responsible companies stand to benefit from a more level playing field, a 
more predictable business environment and better prospects for energy security.” 
 
According to Transparency International (n.d.) the solution to fight corruption is to ensure 
disclosure and public access to all relevant information. For increased transparency to have an 
impact on corruption, stakeholders must have incentives and ability to act on the information 
provided. Like other institutional changes, reforms that increase transparency and 
accountability are likely to be difficult to implement in corrupt countries because government 
officials who benefit from the information asymmetry will tend to resist these changes 
(Kolstad and Wiig, 2008). 
 
 
3.5   Diversification  
 
3.5.1. Resource dependency 
Why should countries with an abundance of natural resources diversify their economies 
instead of specializing on their comparative advantage? The assumption that diversification is 
exclusively beneficial may not seem obvious from an economic point of view, but several 
researchers, including Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (2007) and Gelb (2010) argue that 
diversification is one of the main solutions to avoid the resource curse. Furthermore, 
Lederman and Maloney (2007) find a negative correlation between export concentration and 
economic growth. Although the theoretic recommendations are fairly conclusive, many 
resource-rich countries remain dependent on the exploitation of these resources. 
 
Natural resource dependency can be measured from different variables; primary exports in 
percentage of total exports, resource revenues as a share of total fiscal revenues or the 
resource sectors contribution to GDP among others. Chapter 2 of this thesis provided insight 
on the resource dependency of Norway, Botswana, Ghana and Venezuela. All the countries in 
this comparison can be defined as resource dependent using any of the suggested 
measurements, although some more than others. Furthermore, Gelb (2010) argues that these 
numbers understate the real level of oil dependence, because they do not include non-resource 
activities and flows that depend on the domestic spending and export revenue made possible 
by the oil industry. Gelb’s arguments are directed at oil-rich economies, but they can also be 
related other resource endowments like Botswana’s diamonds. 
 
Naturally, economic diversification is a necessity to achieve sustainable growth in countries 
rich in non-renewable resources like petroleum and minerals. Diminishing reserves will 
ultimately result in declining production rates, and without strong non-resource sectors these 
economies are likely to experience severe recessions. Limited supply is not the only reason 
for resource abundant countries to diversify. Even countries like Venezuela, which has oil 
reserves estimated to last 270 years at current production rates, can benefit from 
diversification. 
 
3.5.2. Spillover effects 
According to Karl (2007) natural resource industries are characterized by high capital 
intensity and weak linkages to the broader economy, especially oil production, which is the 
world’s most capital-intensive industry. Resource sectors provide few jobs, and often few 
productive linkages and learning effects that spur growth in the rest of the economy. 
Multiplier effects, or so-called spillover effects, from gaining experience and developing 
technologies that are beneficial for the whole economy seem less pronounced in natural 
resource production. If growth in the resource sector had a significant spillover effect, lack of 
diversification would be less of a problem. Gelb (2010) compares the production of toasters 
with resource industries. Companies in a country that export toasters have the capabilities to 
move to a wider range of white goods. Investments in sectors with a “dense” product space 
can have positive externalities, but in resource sectors there is often no clear knowledge, skills 
or market relationships with other industries.  
 
Gylfason, Herbertsson and Zoega (1999) find that resource sectors experience less learning by 
doing. Industries like oil and hard minerals bring fewer productivity increases than the 
manufacturing industry. Because of the enclave nature of the resource industries, diffusion of 
technological developments to other sectors is limited. 
 
3.5.3. Education 
Gylfason, Herbertsson and Zoega (1999) also point to the fact that resource industries 
typically do not require as much high-skilled labour and advanced capital as other industries, 
with a few exceptions like high-tech oil-drilling operations. Moreover, rents from natural 
resources make governments less dependent on the development of human capital. Gylfason 
et al. show that school enrollment at all levels is negatively related to natural resource 
abundance. In the other end, Finland and South-Korea, known for their “spectacular evolution 
from primary-based economies to exporters of high-tech manufactures”, consistently rank at 
the top of worldwide educational quality comparisons. Out of countries specializing on 
natural resources, only Norway scores high in these rankings (Gelb, 2010, p. 10). Gylfason et 
al. (1999) claim that more and better education shift the comparative advantage away from 
resource industries towards manufacturing and services, and thereby accelerate learning by 
doing. 
 
3.5.4. Final remarks 
Gelb (2010) argue that diversification does not necessarily imply shifting to the 
manufacturing industry. Diversification can also mean maximizing the supply chain within 
the resource sector; either through domestic upstream linkages between different resource 
industries, or through strengthening links between the resource base and downstream 
processing industries. 
 
As mentioned, many resource-rich countries have not managed to diversify their economies. 
Whether this is due to deliberate strategies or policies failures, is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but as chapter 3.4 explains, equilibrium forces in countries with weak institutions will 
tend to resist reforms that reduce opportunities for rent seeking and patronage. 
 
 
3.6.   Privatization versus nationalization of the resource sector 
 
The ownership structure of natural resource industries is another consideration for resource-
rich countries. Privatization has been pushed as a tool for economic development by the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Palley, 2003). The obvious benefits of 
privatizing the resource sector are to remove political agendas and ensure efficiency through 
profit maximizing motives. More competent management, both domestic and foreign, can 
also be involved. Furthermore, resource sectors in need of massive investments to increase 
production will benefit from foreign direct investments. 
 
Privatization can also improve social contact between the government and citizens. A 
symptom of rentier states is that the resource rents reduce necessity of social contact: the 
incentives to create other sources of revenue from the population through taxes are low. 
Weinthal and Jones Luong (2001, p. 217) argue that countries should privatize their resource 
sectors in order to escape the resource curse. With private ownership: 
 
 “The state has less control over how the resources are distributed and utilized and are thus 
compelled to develop mechanisms for extracting revenue from private owners as well as to 
generate other sources of revenue outside its natural resource sector. They may therefore be 
more likely to invest in institution-building – most notably, reliable tax administrations and 
stable tax regimes that provide a broad tax base and ensure popular compliance – as well as to 
develop other sectors (e.g. manufacturing and agriculture), and perhaps even to invest in 
human resources.”  
 
In “Escaping the Resource Curse” Stiglitz claims that reduced possibilities for government 
corruption is not a good argument for privatizing the resource sector (Humphreys et al., 
2007). Without complete transparency there will be an agency problem where the agents, 
whether it is the government officials or private companies, have incentives to divert resource 
rents to their own private benefit. This behavior conflicts the interest of whom the agents are 
supposed to serve, the principals, or more specifically the citizens of the resource-rich 
country. Corruption occurs both in government enterprises and private firms. Furthermore, 
profit maximizing companies have incentives to minimize payments to the government for the 
right to control their assets. 
 
The process of privatization is also costly and difficult, and the process itself provides vast 
opportunities for corruption. Stiglitz notes that “those arguing for privatization must show that 
the losses from maintain the resources within the public sector are greater than the combined 
losses associated with the transfer and the losses from agency problems after privatization” 
(Humphreys et al., 2007, p. 30). Another argument against privatization is that assets often 
end up in the hands of foreign companies, thereby preventing domestic learning and spillover 
effects.  
 
In his study of Norway, Larsen (2004) claims that the country may have managed to induce 
spillover effects, or learning by doing, from the oil industry by keeping the sector under 
government control and promote domestic participation. Larsen suggests that experienced 
international companies should lead exploration and initial production, while the governments 
ensure that domestic companies are allowed to participate. After a gradual accumulation of 
competence, domestic firms can be given more important roles. This approach reduces costs 
and risks associated with underqualified domestic companies, and productive innovations and 
know-how gained can create productive linkages to other sectors.  
 
 
3.7.   Volatility and fiscal policy 
 
Diversification is also important to avoid the volatility of resource dependent economies. 
Commodity prices are characterized by high price fluctuations, and oil prices are particularly 
volatile. This implies that less diversified resource economies are vulnerable to economic 
shocks, or frequent boom-bust cycles; another reason to adapt policies that seeks to diversify 
the economy. Volatility has several negative effects on growth. The exchange rate appreciates 
during boom cycles with high international commodity prices, and depreciates during bust 
cycles or recessions. It negatively affects budgetary discipline, control of public finances and 
long term plans (Karl, 2007), and reduces the attractiveness of investments, especially foreign 
direct investments because less risky assets are preferred (Lewin, 2011).  
 
3.7.1. Countercyclical spending 
Lewin (2010) claims that fiscal policies often exacerbate these tendencies because 
government spending is expansionary in boom cycles, and contractionary in bust cycles. 
Government spending increases when revenues rise and optimistic governments borrow 
against future revenues. When the commodity prices and revenues decline, governments are 
stuck with debt overhang instead of accumulated assets that could stimulate the economy. 
Debt overhang from the 1970s is can be used to explain the weak performance of resource-
rich economies as Manzano and Rigobon (2001) found in their study presented in chapter 3.1.  
 
Accordingly, effective fiscal policy is of high importance to countries aiming to escape the 
resource curse. Most research on fiscal policy and resource abundance, i.e. (Karl, 2007, 
Frankel, 2010 and Lewin, 2011), stress that prudent fiscal policy during boom is vital to 
dampen the contraction during bust cycles. There are many examples of governments not 
being able to resist the temptation or political pressure to increase spending during 
economically optimistic times. According to Frankel (2010) investment projects and the 
government wage bill accounts for much of the increased spending in boom periods. 
Investments in infrastructure can have a positive impact on future productivity and sustainable 
growth, but these projects are often “white elephants” – unproductive but politically 
prestigious projects, that are often stranded without funds for completion or maintenance 
when recessions occur. Similarly, increased public employment or higher public wages are 
often unsustainable when government revenues suddenly fall due to rapid decline in 
commodity prices. Reduction of workforce or wages however, is difficult and takes time. This 
lag creates increased debt.  
 
The main point is that fiscal policy should be countercyclical rather than procyclical to 
moderate the shocks from high commodity price volatility. Countries should borrow during 
recessions to sustain consumption and investment, and exercise prudent fiscal discipline 
during boom cycles by repaying debt or accumulating assets. 
 
3.7.1. Taxation 
Rodriguez et al. (2012, p. 3) argue that governments should modernize their tax 
administrations and expand their tax base, not only because increased taxation increase fiscal 
revenues, but also because it has a significant impact on governance. They state that: 
 
“Taxation, by forcing citizens to forgo part of their income to finance the state, generates 
incentives for them to demand accountability and an efficient use of what is essentially their 
money. Furthermore, when forced to rely on broad taxation, governments are more compelled 
to provide something in exchange, be it representation or public goods and services that 
benefit all. Resource rents on the other hand, do not accrue from broad based taxation but 
rather from a narrow economic base that often consists of foreign companies or state owned 
companies.”  
 
This point of view is supported by Moss and Young (2009, p. 7). They note that much of the 
“research on the resource curse can be interpreted as a break-down in the social contract 
between the citizens and the state”. 
 
 
3.8. Resource funds 
 
Accumulation of foreign exchange reserves in Sovereign Wealth Funds can be an important 
fiscal tool to help avoid procyclical spending and control the mechanisms causing problems 
related to the resource curse. Saving can ensure that countries preserve wealth to a future 
point in time when non-renewable resource reserves are depleted. Consumption can be 
sustained indefinitely if the Hartwick rule (Hartwick, 1977) is applied. If following the 
Hartwick rule, all resource rents should be reinvested in “produced capital” as a substitution 
for the depletion of resource. This is rarely applied however (Hamilton and World Bank, 
2006). Secondly, it reduces inflationary pressure, which reduces export competitiveness. 
Combined with adequate governance Sovereign Wealth Funds can also help preventing rent 
seeking and patronage. According to Frankel (2010) the standard recommendations for 
resource funds are that they should be professionally run, politically independent and 
operations should be transparent. The objective of maximizing the prosperity of the country 
should be emphasized. 
 
Another way of accumulating reserves is through the central bank. According to Frankel 
(2010) economist have regarded this as a sub-optimal solution. First of all, returns on foreign 
exchange, typically US treasury bills, is low. Secondly, reserve increases can lead to rapid 
monetary expansion and inflation if the central bank is not able to successfully sterilize the 
capital inflows. The increased monetary base can be offset by encouraging foreign private 
investment or foreign borrowing in the domestic market, but is typically done by selling 
treasury bills. These initiatives can be difficult to execute successfully (Lee, 1997). Political 
independence and transparent operations of resource funds are important to avoid abuse by 
the government. If the Central Bank has political independence and the resource fund does 
not, the reserves should be left “where they cannot be raided” (p. 33). 
 
Warner (2013) argue that governments are faced with two conflicting options to confront the 
resource curse and increase growth; invest in offshore assets or in the domestic economy. 
The optimal decision depends on the real return of the domestic investments. The latter option 
is more attractive if long term growth can be boosted through productive public investments. 
Developing countries with a struggling population often assume that returns to public 
investments are high because of the great needs. However this assessment should not be based 
on wishful thinking. Warner gives examples of enormous investments in resource-rich 
countries in boom periods, including Saudi-Arabia, which led to improvements in health and 




3.9. Monetary policy 
 
What monetary policy should developing countries adapt to avoid the macroeconomic 
mechanisms of the resource curse? The best solutions are highly circumstantial. 
 
Keeping a fixed exchange rate reduces the cost of international trade, and helps the central 
bank to keep inflation at low rates. Frankel (2010) claims that maintaining a fixed exchange 
rate may be appropriate for very small and open countries. A floating exchange rate however, 
acts as a buffer for volatile commodity prices because the currency appreciates during boom 
cycles and thereby reduces excessive capital inflows. In bust cycles the currency depreciates 
and improves terms of trade for the export industry. Several commodity exporters maintain an 
intermediate exchange rate regime like a managed floating exchange rate or target zone. A 
managed floating exchange rate can be especially beneficial for countries in the early stages 
of a possibly temporary resource boom; the Central Bank can intervene in the foreign 
exchange market to avoid rapid expansion in the money supply (Frankel, 2010). 
 
Resource dependent countries also need to consider the effect of the chosen nominal target for 
the Central Bank. According to Frankel both monetary economists and central bankers tend to 
favor inflation targeting over exchange rate targeting. Inflation targeting usually takes the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) as the index to measure inflation. The problem of the CPI for 
resource exporters is the procyclical effects. When commodity prices fall, it would be 
beneficial with loose monetary policy through a depreciation or devaluation of the currency. 
If following a CPI target however, the central bank need to keep monetary policy tight 
because depreciation will cause import prices to rise and the CPI can be pushed above the 
target range.  
 
Frankel suggests another policy regime; Peg the Export Price (PEG). PEG pegs the currency 
to the main commodity prices on a daily basis; if dollar price of oil increases by 1%, monetary 
policy allows the currency of the oil dependent country to appreciate by 1% to keep the local 
price of oil fixed. Similarly to a floating exchange rate, PEG automatically adjusts the effect 
of price fluctuations on terms of trade in economies with a large resource sector. A PEG 
regime has disadvantages for non-resource sectors however. The burden of volatile 




3.10.   Summary 
 
This chapter has aimed to provide a foundation for the analysis of the research questions from 
chapter 1. Empirical evidence supporting the resource curse theory was presented, before a 
review of studies on macroeconomic mechanisms and political economy explained the forces 
driving the negative impact of resource abundance. Various dimensions of institutional 
quality, and policies advocated to address the resource curse mechanisms, were then 
described. The theoretical framework on resource curse avoidance from this chapter will be 
used to analyze the impact of institutional differences and various economic policies in the 























Because of the nature of the research questions, and the small sample size of only four 
countries, an exploratory research and qualitative data collection and analysis, is found to be 
most purposeful. Chapter 4.1 and 4.2 will shortly present the most important methods in 
social science, but most attention will be given to the exploratory and qualitative research. 
The chosen method qualitative method is then described in chapter 4.3. 
 
4.1.   Classification of research designs 
 
According to Zikmund, Babin, Carr and Griffin (2010), the research design represents the 
“master plan” for the study as a guide in collecting and analyzing data. No research design 
can be argued to be correct, or incorrect, but the type of research design should be consistent 
with the purpose of the research. The fundamental objective of the research can be classified 
as exploratory, descriptive or causal.  
 
Exploratory research is often conducted as a preliminary step of descriptive or casual 
research. This type of research aims to explore ideas or insight by breaking a vague problem 
statement into smaller, more precise research questions or hypothesis, clarify concepts or 
testing measurement methods (Zikmund et al., 2010). Bhattacherjee (2012) note that the 
hypotheses created can then be valuable for descriptive research later. Exploratory research 
“attempts to connect the dots”, by “identifying causal factors and outcomes of the target 
phenomenon” (2012, p. 6). According to Zikmund et al. (2010) it can also contribute to 
answer research questions however. Exploratory research methods include literature search, 
experience surveys, focus groups, and analysis of selected cases. Ghauri and Grønhaug (2002) 
state that exploratory research design should be flexible, as new information can cause the 
research to change direction. They argue that key attributes to a good exploratory research 
design is the ability to observe, gather information and construct explanations. 
 
Descriptive research design is used when the purpose is to describe characteristics of certain 
groups, to estimate the proportion of subjects in a population, or to analyze relationships 
between variables or make predictions. While exploratory research is often used when the 
researcher seeks to gain insight, descriptive research must start with prior knowledge about 
the phenomenon studied. Descriptive research should be based on clear specifications of the 
population studied, how it should be performed, and it should be based on specified 
hypotheses. Common examples of descriptive research methods are cross sectional studies, 
which involve a one-time measurement of a sample from the population of interest, and 
longitudinal studies, which use repeated measurements. 
 
Causal research seeks to infer causality between variables. As Zikmund et al. note, the 
scientific notion of causality can never prove that X is a cause of Y, but a hypothesis can be 
supported if the occurrence of X makes the occurrence of Y more likely. The most common 
casual research methods are experiments, which are further classified into different types of 
laboratory- or field experiments.  
 
4.2.   Qualitative and quantitative research processes 
 
Quantitative research methods seek to describe or analyze causality. They typically us large 
sample sizes to generalize findings. Collection and analysis of data should follow a structured 
plan and focus should be on neutral and objective interpretation of findings. Because of the 
large number of respondents, knowledge of each respondent will be superficial (Zikmund et 
al. 2010).  
 
Zikmund et al. (2010) state that qualitative research methods are often used to explore 
develop hypotheses and to test structured interview schemes. As opposed to quantitative 
methods, qualitative methods are usually based on small, non-representative samples. 
Qualitative research emphasizes understanding of the unique and particular instead of 
searching for law-like generalizations. This type of research is more subjective than 
quantitative processes, as the researcher’s interests and personal values will influence the 
interpretation. Furthermore, qualitative research is described as more holistic: The research 
seeks to understand the interplay between individuals and the context. According to Andersen 
(2013) qualitative research is most appropriate when the purpose of the research is to develop 
hypotheses. 
 
Qualitative data can be collected through for instance observations, depth interviews or 
content analysis based on secondary data. After finishing the qualitative data collection, the 
findings are analyzed. Zikmund et al. (2010) claim that main problem for the data analysis is 
to reduce the amount and complexity of the data collected. Decisions on what should be 
emphasized, minimized or eliminated from further study should be based on the relevance for 
research questions. After collecting and reducing the data, the researcher should look for 
relationships between categories, characteristics of single respondents and characteristics of 
the context. Quantitative methods can be used in qualitative research for the purpose of 
studying similarities and differences between units. Next, the content of the relationships are 
described, by focusing on why there are differences and similarities. The final step of the 




4.3.   Chosen research design: An exploratory comparative analysis 
 
Exploratory research design 
Since objective of this analysis is to find possible solutions to avoid the problems many 
resource-rich countries face, an exploratory research design seems most appropriate.  
An exploratory comparative research method is used to form hypotheses on how institutions 
and economic policies from Norway and Botswana can help Ghana and Venezuela to avoid 
the resource curse. 
 
Qualitative data collection 
Qualitative research also seems most beneficial because of the complex nature of the resource 
curse mechanisms. Knowledge of human behavior and its implications to the outcome of 
policies and reforms is vital to understand ways of escaping the resource curse. Furthermore, 
quantitative data cannot always be compared across borders because of various contextual 
features, and causal relationships between policies and growth can be difficult to test for 
without significant simplifications. There are so many variables affecting growth in resource-
rich countries that to empirically test the impact of i.e. a new monetary policy will require a 
very high amount of control variables including commodity price fluctuations, fiscal policy 
and institutional changes. Content analysis is therefore based on qualitative secondary data 
from the books and journals on the resource curse, and up to date country-specific data from 
governments, nongovernmental organizations and other sources. This data provide the basis 
for the analytic process of answering the research questions. Findings are also supported by 
historical numerical data however. 
 
Comparative analysis 
In a comparative design, two or more cases are compared both cross-sectional and through an 
extended period of time (Blekesaune, 2005). Data may be collected using a combination of 
interviews, personal observations, and internal or external documents.  A comparative case 
analysis is similar to a multiple case design. Bhattacherjee (2012, p. 40) states the following 
about case analysis: 
 
“The strength of this research method is its ability to discover a wide variety of social, 
cultural, and political factors potentially related to the phenomenon of interest that may not be 
known in advance. Interpretation of findings may depend on the observational and integrative 
ability of the researcher, lack of control may make it difficult to establish causality, and 
findings from a single case site may not be readily generalized to other case sites. 
Generalizability can be improved by replicating and comparing the analysis in other case sites 
in a multiple case design”. 
 
A comparative design has been chosen over a more narrow case study of one or two countries 
to find explore more variables, or policy recommendations, applicable in countries with 
various contextual features. There is a trade-off however between a more detailed analysis on 
an institutional level and a more broad cross-country comparison. Since this is qualitative 
study, the comparison is limited to four countries to be able to explore a high amount of 
variables. 
 
The countries in this comparative study are systematically selected according to a method of 
difference (Lijphart, 1971). There are two cases of countries that are found to have avoided 
the resource curse, two cases of countries that remain vulnerable to curse. The four cases 
compared share one similarity; resource abundance, but otherwise they are heterogeneous in 
many ways. Resource curse mechanisms are affected by several political, social and historical 
factors, and experiences from one country cannot necessarily be transferred to another. By 
contrasting two growth successes from two different continents, which discovered resources 
at different levels of development, with less successful countries which also differ 
significantly from each other, the aim is to find relationships between the cases that can infer 
possible policy recommendations and more nuanced interpretations of the phenomenon. 
Norway and Botswana are not representative for all successful resource-rich countries, and 
Ghana and Venezuela are not representative for all the countries that remain vulnerable to the 
resource curse, but they do represent a wide range of attributes. 
 
 
4.4.   Validity and reliability 
 
Validity is the extent to which a measurement is capable of measuring what it is intended to 
measure. Reliability refers to the consistency of results if the study is repeated (Zikmund et al. 
2010). The quality of the conclusions in this comparative analysis is dependent on the quality 
of the analysis of the individual countries. If these analyses are not valid, the similarities and 
differences that create the foundation for the conclusions will be flawed as well. To enhance 
validity and reliable results, efforts of triangulation has been used. The analysis is based on 
qualitative data from a wide range of sources including books, economic journals, 
government documents and newspaper articles. Qualitative data is also supported by statistics. 










Lessons from Norway and Botswana 
 
 
How do institutions in Ghana and Venezuela differ from Norway and Botswana? 
 
5.1.   The institutions of successful countries 
 
Norway 
Holden (2013) notes that when oil was discovered in Norway in 1969, the country had already 
been a stable democracy since 1905. Norway had a well-functioning bureaucracy with little 
corruption, the legal system worked well, and a free and active press was evaluating and 
commenting the government and other institutions. Eifert et al. (2002) names Norway as a 
“prototype representative” of a mature democracy, which together with reformist autocracies 
is found to manage resource revenues well. Norway is a parliamentary democracy, with 
institutions described as highly consensus-oriented. Involvement of interest groups 
representing business and labor is strong. The institutions have successfully reconciled 
competing claims for oil revenues with goals of long-term planning and stability. 
Parliamentary democracies are found to be superior in terms of promoting growth, as 
described in chapter 3.4 (Andersen and Aslaksen, 2008).  
 
Norway has a proportional representation system where parties are assigned parliamentary 
seats in “Stortinget” proportionally to the number of votes they get.  According to Kunicová 
and Rose-Ackerman (2005) corruption is lower under a majority election system than under 
proportional rules. However, the correlation between proportional representation and 
corruption is stronger when proportional representation is combined with a presidential 
system. Most studies rank Norway among the least corrupt countries in the world, as indicated 
in Figure 5. 
 
According to Eifert et al. (2002, p. 9) “Norway also has a strong pro-stabilization constituency 
in the form of employees, trade union and business leaders, and voters who are dependent on 
the non-oil tradable sectors for their well-being and have a good understanding of the need for 
restraint in public spending and the avoidance of a volatile expenditure pattern.”  
 
Furthermore, Eifert et al. note that political differences are relatively small compared to other 
countries, and values are egalitarian. The effect of social norms and cultural distinctions like 
these are difficult to document and quantify, but may be important for the institutional 
equilibrium. As Stevens (2003) emphasize, it is not only important to look at the particular 
policies adopted, but why these policies were followed in the first place. A broad social 
consensus of the importance of equality may have constrained dysfunctional elitist behavior 
and allowed implementation of policies that benefitted the whole population. Holden (2013, p. 
2) claims that: 
 
“The management of the petroleum resources reflects the view among Norwegian decision 
makers that the resources belong to the nation, and that the development should benefit the 
society as a whole, including future generations.” 
 
The indicators of “good governance” used by The World Bank project Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) is closely related to institutional quality, which is presented in 
chapter 3.4 as an integral part of the resource mechanisms. WGI (2013a) defines governance 
as “the set of traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised.” 
Implicitly, governance is seen as shaped by a country’s institutions, which is a wider term 
defined as “rules of the game” or equilibrium outcomes in chapter 3.2.  
 
Figure 5 presents data retrieved from The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). WGI is a 
dataset summarizing the views on different dimensions of the quality of governance in more 
than 200 countries. Ratings are computed from an average of surveys and expert studies 
conducted by a wide range of sources, including survey institutions, non-governmental 
organizations and private firms (WGI, 2013a). The six governance indicators are all presented 
in chapter 3.  
 
As studies presented in chapter 3 show, “Control of corruption” and “rule of law” are 
arguably significant for well-functioning institutions. Furthermore, the high levels of “voice 
and accountability” typically found in mature democracies like Norway, are found to 
beneficial for resource rich countries. These features help aligning the interest of the 
population with the interest of the government, and corruption and dysfunctional behavior 
among government officials is constrained because they are held accountable for their actions. 
“Political stability” is claimed to be an advantage of mature democracies because it leads to a 
long term policy horizon, while “Violence and terrorism” are characteristics of predatory 
autocracies like Nigeria. WGI (2013a) states that “Regulatory quality” measures the 
perception of the government’s ability to “formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development”, which is related to chapter 
3.5 about diversification. “Government effectiveness” indicates the level of quality of public 
services and competence of civil servants, and their independence from political pressure. It 
also measures the perception of the perception of the quality of policy formulation and 




Figure 5. Adapted from Interactive Data Access, Norway, by Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, 2013b, retrieved from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ 
 
The percentile rank shows the percentage of countries which scored lower than Norway. As 
the dataset from WGI show, Norway scores better than 90 percent of the more than 200 
countries compared in all six dimensions of governance indicators. Norway receives a score 
of 100, the best in the world, in Rule of Law and Voice and Accountability. The strong ratings 
from The Worldwide Governance Indicators support the qualitative evidence of high 





Similarly to Norway, Botswana has a long history of multi-party democracy. Botswana is a 
parliamentary republic, which means that the President is dependent on confidence from the 
parliament. While Norway has experienced relatively frequent changes of power, the 
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has been continuously in power since independence. The 
opposition parties are described as “very weak, fragmented and uncooperative” 
(OECD/AfDB, 2007, p. 145). BDP won the first election held in 1965, and has won every 
election since. The parliament consists of the House of Chiefs and the National Assembly. 
Members of the House of Chiefs are hereditary tribal leaders. Their function is largely 
advisory, and the constitution gives them no real legislative power (Acemoglu et al. 2002). 
The National Assembly consists of the President and Attorney General and 4 seats appointed 
by the winning party BDP and 57 elected members. In the latest 2009 election, Botswana 
Democratic Party (BDP) won 45 of the 57 seats (Central Intelligence Agency, 2014a) 
Representation is based on a majority rule, where the country is divided into constituencies, 
which returns one winning member to the National Assemby (Democracy Web, n.d.)  
 
Botswana’s democracy has criticized for being a one-party autocracy in reality. International 
inspections have found elections to free and fair however (Rabin, 2011; Lewin, 2011) and the 
opposition are able to influence public debate (Democracy Web, n.d.)  The press is claimed to 
be relatively free as well. According to Acemoglu et al. (2002) several newspapers openly 
criticize the government and any instances of mismanagement. 
  
So how did BDP manage to gain popularity sufficient to stay in charge for almost 50 years? 
Acemoglu et al. (2002) suggest that the composition of BDP may be the answer. Seretse 
Khama, the first President of Botswana and leader of BDP was a hereditary chief of the 
largest tribal state and also educated in Europe. He was able to gain support among both the 
tribal chiefs and the growing educated elite of teachers and civil servants. 
 
Many studies on the resource curse hold Botswana as one of the best examples of countries 
with good governance and beneficial institutions, i.e. Acemoglu et al. (2002), Leith (2005) 
and Lewin (2011). As shown in chapter 2.2 Botswana has experienced remarkable growth, 
and research suggest that this is due to sound economic policies, allowed to be implemented 
and maintained successfully because of high institutional quality. Eifert et al. (2002) argue 
that even though Botswana is less developed than other mature democracies, it shares many of 
the same features. Lewin (2011, p. 85) states that:  
 
“Very few, if any, mineral-rich countries in Africa have been ruled as peacefully and 
productively as Botswana; it is hard to escape the conclusion that the democratic institutions 
established at independence are an important part of the explanation.” 
 
According to Acemoglu et al. (2002) Botswana had unusual pre-colonial political institutions. 
At the time of independence, before the diamonds industry developed, the country had already 
built relatively democratic and efficient institutions. The tribal institutions allowed regular 
citizens to freely criticize to the chiefs. Wide participation in political processes restricted the 
political power of the elites. Acemoglu et al. believe that Botswana was able to adopt good 
policies and institutions because they were in the interests of the tribal chiefs and cattle 
owners, the political elite at that time. Leith (2005) emphasizes that the government 
established respect for property right and the rule of law. Focus on transparent institutions 
originated from the traditional tribal tradition of consultation. An involved civil society has 
kept government officials accountable for the management of resource revenues, and thereby 
helped reduce rent seeking and patronage.  
 
Several formal structures ensure that accountability remain strong. According to the African 
Development Bank (2009a), there is a strict system of checks and balances for accounting 
procedures and internal auditing. An example is the Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee, 
which is composed of members of both the ruling party and the opposition who are 
responsible for the scrutiny of public service expenditures. Botswana also has a politically 
independent anti-corruption authority, the Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime. 
 
As chapter 2.2 explains, education was almost not existent at the time of Botswana’s 
independence. However the BDP government chose not to “indigenize” the bureaucracy with 
unskilled labor like most other African countries did post-independence. To ensure 
government effectiveness and regulatory quality they hired expatriate workers and used 
international advisers and consultants until suitably qualified citizens of Botswana were 
available (Acemoglu et al., 2002). Cobbe (1999, p. 133) claims Botswana’s success was a “a 
consequence of luck and the presence of the right personalities 
in the right places at the right times”. 
 
 
Figure 6. Adapted from Interactive Data Access, Botswana, by Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, 2013b, retrieved from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ 
 
Botswana scores best of the African countries in all of the six Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, except for “Voice and Accountability”, where only South Africa is ranked slightly 
higher. This is possibly a result of the political dominance of BDP.  As Figure 5.2 shows, 
Botswana scores particularly well in “Political Stability and Absence of Violence” and 
“Control of Corruption”. 
 
 




According to Moss and Young (2009), Ghana has been highly politically stable since a period 
of conflicts and military coups during the 1970’s. The country has been a multiparty 
democracy since. Ghana has a presidential form of democracy (Central Intelligence Agency, 
2014b), which is found to provide fewer incentives for growth-promoting policies than 
parliamentary systems like in Norway and Botswana. Like Botswana, the country use a 
majority rule election system (ibid), associated with increased accountability. 
 
Ghana has had six successive elections since the return to a multiparty democracy in 1992 
(1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012), with two shifts of government between opposing 
parties. The elections have been described as credible and peaceful, and are widely believed 
to reflect the public will.  The parliament actively debates national issues, there is a free and 
vibrant press and an engaged civil society. The country has been hailed for its peace and 
political stability, and U.S. president Barack Obama called it “a model for democracy” in 
Africa (Kermeliotis, 2014). Kuzu and Nantogmah (2010, p. 7) note that: 
 
“Ghana has a maturing, but still young democracy that can serve as the foundation to improve 
the accountability and transparency of the country’s petroleum industry and government 
institutions currently in place to regulate the industry.” 
 
Compared to the quality of institutions of Norway and Botswana however, Ghana seems to 
still lag behind. Agbele (2011) criticizes the democracy because only two political parties are 
able to contest for power. The validity of this argument is debatable however, considering the 
success of the one-party dominance of Botswana’s democracy, and the positive resource 
management of Indonesia’s Suharto led autocracy, for instance. Agbele finds a perhaps more 
problematic institutional arrangement: The winning party tends to fill all top public positions, 
creating an environment that increase rent seeking opportunities for the ruling group. He 
further argues that implementation of anticorruption laws remain weak. As opposed to 
Norway and Botswana, Ghana lacks an effective system for checks and balances on 
government spending.  
 
Amundsen (2013) provides a somewhat contrasting opinion, claiming that Ghana have the 
institutions necessary to ensure productive use of the resource rents. According to Amundsen 
several instances of corruption has been revealed recently. Current debates question whether 
this is a sign of a widespread problem, or well-functioning control systems. Benjamin 
Boakye, an economics expert with the African Center for Energy Policy in Accra, argues that 
Ghana has appropriate legislation, but emphasize that a resource curse can only be avoided if 
members of the civil society hold the government accountable by pushing it to apply the laws 




Figure 7. Adapted from Interactive Data Access, Ghana, by Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, 2013b, retrieved from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ 
 
 
The good governance indicators of Ghana have steadily improved since the data collection by 
WGI began in 1996. Especially perceptions of “Voice and Accountability” and “Rule of Law” 
have improved (Moss and Young, 2009). As Figure 7 shows, Ghana scores better than half of 
the other countries in the latest rankings (WGI, 2013b). Ghana is among the best African 
countries, but score worse than both Norway and Botswana in all six dimensions. 
 
Venezuela 
República Bolivariana de Venezuela is a presidential democracy like Ghana. Members of the 
National Assembly are elected on proportional basis (Central Intelligence Agency, 2014c). 
Presidential regimes with proportional voting systems are found to be particularly corrupt, as 
they are associated with lack of accountability and dysfunctional policies, which chapter 3.4 
explains further. 
 
Similarly to the growth successes Norway and Botswana, Venezuela was a consensual 
democracy through the 1970s and 1980s. However, in Venezuela the governments used oil 
rents from high income taxes on multinational companies to consolidate their power. 
Attempts to diversify the economy with oil rents, particularly during the oil boom in 1974-
1978 and 1979-1981, fed corruption through entitlements, and led to Dutch Disease and a 
further deterioration of institutions (Auty, 2009). From 1978, a prolonged economic 
depression started, and poverty and inequality increase. This culminated with the election of 
political outsider Hugo Chaves in 1998, and the socialistic “Bolivarian Revolution”.  
 
Coronel (2008) note that Chavez was elected on three main promises: writing a new 
constitution and improve the state, fight poverty and eliminate corruption. While Chavez has 
managed to reduce poverty (Plummer, 2012), Coronel (2008) claims that the new constitution 
has been exploited by the Chavez led government to destroy all existing political institutions 
and fill important positions with bureaucrats loyal to the president. Chavez’s government has 
been called a “participatory democracy” (Hirst, 2013), which seeks to increase the 
involvement of the people in decision making processes, but is characterized by disregard for 
separation of power and institutional independence. Several sources find a further increase of 
corruption and reduction of institutional quality (Coronel, 2008; WGI, 2013b). Rodriguez et 
al. (2012) claim that the “media and civil society organizations have been under intense 
pressure from the government”. It’s reported that media have resorted to self-censorship to 
avoid confrontation with the government. Human rights organizations and political parties 
have been deprived part of their revenues and international fund-raising has been prohibited 
by law. These conditions have made it hard for the opposition to compete with the governing 
elite. 
 
Hirst (2013) provides interesting examples of the low quality of institutions in Venezuela. 
Bureaucratic hurdles to accomplish anything administratively feed corruption. For instance 
birth certificates must be renewed every six months. This creates an environment that attracts 
rent seekers, or “enablers”, to assist in processing documents that would otherwise be free of 
charge. Hirst claims that the most significant cause of corruption in Venezuela is probably not 
oil rents but illegal drug trade. The country is a major drug transit route: the majority of drug 
flights between the Americas and West Africa, and 50 percent of drugs seized in Europe, was 
found to come from Venezuela in a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime report (2009, 
as cited in Hirst, 2013). Drug trade and natural resource sectors are similar in the sense that 
they both command high international prices and because of supply restrictions. Similarly to 
oil rents, corruption from drug trade deteriorates institutions. The existence of the enormous 
illegal drug industry can also be seen as evidence of nontransparent institutions and absence 
of a well-functioning rule of law. Hirst also refers to a survey which shows that 50 percent of 
the county’s citizens describe their environments as unsafe or very unsafe. The results from 
the capital Caracas are extreme: 90 percent characterize their city as dangerous. Caracas is 
widely regarded as one of the most violent cities in the world. 
 
Several sources find that the government has been increasingly authoritarian under Chavez 
and his handpicked successor Nicolas Maduro (Rodriguez et al., 2012; Human Rights Watch, 
2014). Rodriguez et al claim that the authoritarian rule, combined with a lack of formal and 
transparent mechanisms of oil revenue distribution, is a large part of the problem in 
Venezuela. Rossi (2011) notes that Venezuela’s economic framework is founded on political 
favor, or patronage, rather than economic fundamentals. It seems clear that the institutions of 
Venezuela translate into policies that are not able to promote sustainable growth.  
 
In the framework of Eifert et al. (2002), Venezuela is named as an example of a “factional 
democracy”, along with its South American neighbors Ecuador and Colombia. Except for 
having relatively high income equality, as chapter 2.4 mentions, the characteristics Eifert et al. 
(2002) attribute to factional democracies seem to be an accurate description of the institutions 
in Venezuela (p. 7):   
 
“Political parties are often weak, and formed around charismatic leaders; military 
intervention in politics is not uncommon. Governments are often unstable; where they 
are stable, single-party dominance underlies nominally democratic institutions. In either 
form, political support derives from systems of patronage. The short-horizon politics of 
competition for power and state-allocated resources gives rise to unstable policy regimes 
and nontransparent mechanisms of rent distribution, encouraging the development of 
clientelistic networks and rent-seeking behavior throughout state and society.”  
 
The democratic elections of Venezuela may actually have exacerbated the resource curse 
mechanisms because governments have had incentives to exploit resource revenues to 
strengthen their position before the end of the election period. With such nontransparent 
institutions, tightening public expenditure means losing support, and thereby control over the 
enormous rents. As chapter 3.4 explains, Eifert et al. (2002) find that reformist autocracies 
perform better than factional democracies. Perhaps the economy of Venezuela would perform 




Figure 8. Adapted from Interactive Data Access, Venezuela, by Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, 2013b, retrieved from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ 
 
WGI’s (2013b) database shows a steep decline from already low numbers on governance 
indicators. The surveys support the qualitative evidence of a low level of institutional quality 
in Venezuela. Figure 8 shows that Venezuela score considerably worse than the other 
countries analyzed in this cross-country comparison. While still ranked low, “Voice and 
Accountability” is perceived as the best dimension of Venezuela’s governance indicators. 
This is probably because of the democratic elections every six years. Venezuela is ranked 
among the worst countries in the world for “Control of Corruption”, “Regulatory Quality” and 







How do the countries differ in terms of economic policies? 
 






As chapter 2.1 presents, the petroleum-led growth has been impressive compared to other 
developed countries. Despite having a small population of only 5 million people and 
simultaneously being one of the leading oil and natural gas exporters in the world, the 
Norwegian economy seems less dependent on resource revenues than the other countries in 
this comparison. GDP per capita is among the highest in the world and current contribution of 
the petroleum sector to GDP is not more than 21 percent (Statistics Norway, 2013). 
According to Holden (2013) the petroleum sector only employs around 2 percent of the total 
workforce in Norway. However, the sector is more important for labor when it comes to 
demand for investment goods and other inputs. Around 8 percent of the employment is 
associated with the demand from petroleum activities. 
 
Several sources argue that Norway has, at least to some degree, managed to diversify its 
economy (Arnold, 2012; The Economist, 2013) particularly by a centralized wage spillover 
effects (Larsen, 2004), and by building human capital (Gelb, 2010). Norway rank 
exceptionally high among resource-rich countries in worldwide educational quality 
comparisons, according to Gelb (2010). It is estimated that the human capital now accounts 
for 82 per cent of Norway's national wealth compared with just 7 per cent for petroleum 
(Arnold, 2012).  
 
Non-resource sectors have suffered from lack of competitiveness however. According to 
Amundsen (2013) Norway had a thriving textile industry before the discovery of oil, which 
“basically disappeared after massive investments in the oil sector”. The large demand from 
the increasing oil sector started a restructuring of the Norwegian economy, crowding out other 
production activities (Larsen, 2004). Larsen finds that the oil production as a share of total 
economic output became fairly constant early on. There have been no signs of an increasing 
dependence of oil revenues.  
 
Larsen (2004) argues that the centralized wage negotiation system of Norway has helped the 
country avoid the Dutch Disease. He claims that Norway has succeeded in making 
manufacturing the wage leader in the labor market, not the resource extraction sector. Because 
the parties involved in wage negotiations are large unions of employers and employees that 
need to be able to consider aggregate interests, unsustainable appreciation of wages have been 
constrained. Productivity increases in the manufacturing sector is institutionalized as the 
accepted wage increase ceiling.  
  
As explained in chapter 3.5 natural resource industries are generally capital intensive, 
required little skilled labor, and provide few productive linkages and learning by doing 
effects. Spillover effects are therefore more prominent in other sectors like manufacturing. 
High-tech oil-drilling operation is an exception however, because of the critical need for 
expertise and innovative processes. Larsen (2004) suggest that the spillover-loss in Norway 
may have been much lower than in other oil producing countries because of accumulation of 
domestic know-how and expertise in offshore extraction, and the immense real capital needed 
in the offshore oil industry.  
 
Diversification has mostly happened within the resource sector, both through upstream 
linkages from oil to different resource industries, and through downstream links to processing 
industries. According to an article by The Economist (2013) Norway is now considered the 
world’s deep-sea drilling capital. Norwegian companies have expertise in various drilling 
techniques and have developed cost-effective methods of exploratory drilling in rough 
offshore conditions. Norwegian companies sell their offshore expertise to the rest of the 
world. The same strategy has been adopted by other industries, most notably in fish farming, 
where Norwegian companies use the most advanced technology in the world (Arnold, 2012). 
Even though petroleum remains the largest sector, Norway has developed an increasingly 
diverse export base. It is world’s leading exporter of sub-sea technology and products, the 





As mentioned in chapter 2.2, the mining sector has consistently contributed to around 40 
percent of GDP since 1980 (Mehlum et al., 2006). Debswana Diamond Company produces 
more than 70 percent of export revenues and 30 percent of GDP. Several reports emphasize 
that Botswana’s government has strived to diversify its economy away from diamond mining. 
One of the primary objectives of Botswana’s macroeconomic policies is to create an 
environment that promote private-sector growth and export diversification (OECD/AfDB, 
2007). Diversification efforts are described as largely unsuccessful however (Siphambe, 2007; 
African Development Bank, 2009b; Meija and Castel, 2012). Despite the lack of 
diversification Botswana’s has enjoyed one of the highest economic growth rates in the world 
since its independence. Siphambe finds that over the period 1974 to 2006, average yearly 
growth in real GDP was 8 percent. Even though growth in non-mining sectors was lower, it 
was still high, at 6.8 percent per year. According to Warner (2013) growth outside was 
relatively slow until the mid-1990s. Diamond production increased so much that it accounted 
for 70 percent of the increase in GDP between 1970 and 1996. Since 1996 growth has 
continued still continued however, and non-resource sectors are catching up. He finds that 
Botswana is a “one of the few mineral-rich countries to show fast growth after a resource 
boom”. 
 
According to Mejia and Castel (2012) there are narrow linkages to between the mining sector 
and the rest of the economy. Similar to the oil industry, mining is capital-intensive, which 
limit opportunities for employment. Despite being the dominant sector of the Botswana’s 
economy, mining employs only about 2 percent of the workforce like in the case of the 
Norwegian petroleum industry. Botswana’s mining industry has not provided the same 
productive spillover effects however. 
 
The BDP government has made large investments in human capital, health and infrastructure, 
which have raised Botswana’s productivity (Acemoglu et al., 2002; Lewin, 2011). Compared 
to the situation in 1966 developments in these areas are enormous, but because of the high 
HIV/aids prevalence, education and health outcomes are still below other countries in the 
upper-middle income group. Attempts to develop a competitive manufacturing industry seem 
to have failed however. Siphambe (2007) notes that “this sector has certainly not matched the 
hopes and expectations of the people and government of Botswana that wanted to position it 
as a key to a successful diversification of the economy.” Meija and Castel (2012) argue that 
the slow pace of economic diversification into the manufacturing industry are caused by a 
small domestic market, high cost of labor relative to the region, and human capital not fitted 
to the market demand. Even diversification within the resource sector has been minimal. Meat 
production was the only significant manufacturing activity at the time of independence, and 
the only major additions have been brewery activities started in the 1970s, and recent textile 
and garment production. A Hyundai Motor plant was built in the 1990s but operations were 
later discontinued (Siphambe, 2007). 
 
The non-resource growth has mainly been fuelled by the government sector. The government 
is the largest employer in the country, employing 30 percent of the active workforce (Lewin, 
2011). Government-induced demand has strengthened growth and development of the 
domestic economy through a large expansion of public services, particularly education, as 
well as public investment in infrastructure (Siphambe, 2007). Siphambe claims that: 
 
“Even though the government sectors may be seen to have grown due to resources deriving 
from the mining sector, it has most significantly acted as a channel through which the wealth 
created by diamond mining has been reinvested in the economy. So in effect, over the 
period from 1966 to the present, the government has acted as the main link between the 
booming mining sector and the rest of the economy as a whole, a role that has spurred the 
rapid rate of overall development recorded during the period.” 
 
Siphambe also emphasizes the rising contribution of the financial services sector (banks, 
insurance and business services) and trade, hotels and restaurants. Demand from these types 
of services is a reflection of increased demand from domestic firms, increasing real incomes 
and a growing tourism sector. 
 
As chapter 3.5 explains, resources-rich countries tend to prioritize education less than 
resource-poor countries. Botswana seems to be one of the exceptions; its expenditure on 
education relative to income is among the highest in the world (Frankel, 2010). Even if 
diversification efforts have failed produce significant results in private non-resource sectors so 
far, Lewin (2011) argues that the investments in human capital and improvements in 
infrastructure, together with large financial reserves, should bring long term benefits that will 
ease the transition to a more diversified economy.  
 
5.3.2. Government involvement in the resource sector 
 
Norway 
The Norwegian government claim sovereignty over the Norwegian continental shelf. 
Regulations from 1963 determine that “the right to submarine natural resources is vested in 
the State” and that the government would have to authorize licenses for exploration and 
exploitation of these resources (LOV-1963-06-21-12).  
 
Taxation of the petroleum sector has been heavy. Holden (2013) argues that this policy was 
adopted to make sure that oil revenues were exploited in a safe and profitable way, and that 
the oil revenues reaped by the state were maximized. Another clear goal of state involvement 
was to make sure that Norwegian companies could participate and thereby build up expertise. 
Chapter 5.3.1 explains how Norway may have managed to avoid spillover-loss due to 
accumulation of know-how and expertise from participation in high-tech offshore operations.  
 
Holden (2013) further explains that the obstacle to Norwegian participation was that the 
operations in the North Sea required high competence. Cost and risks associated with giving 
key roles to underqualified Norwegian companies posed a significant problem. A successful 
trade-off was achieved by letting experienced international oil companies lead in the 
beginning, while maintaining government control and Norwegian participation. After a 
gradual accumulation of competence, Norwegian firms have been given an increasingly 
important role, both in extraction and supply of inputs. 
 
As chapter 2.1 mentions, Phillips Petroleum and other foreign companies dominated the 
exploration and development of the first oil and gas fields in Norway (Norwegian Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy, 2013). During the 1970s however, the Norwegian involvement 
gradually increased through the state owned Statoil and the private companies Hydro and 
Saga. Founded in 1972, Statoil was given a 50 percent participation share in each production 
license of all new fields. This rule was later changed, and Stortinget (the Norwegian 
parliament) can now evaluate if the level of state participation should be higher or lower than 
this. Statoil was privatized in 2001, but the Norwegian government still holds 67 percent of 




The government of Botswana and De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd formed the company 
Debswana Diamond Company (Pty) Ltd in 1978. This is a joint venture partnership where 
each holds 50 percent of the shares. Debswana owns the four diamond mines operating in 
Botswana, but other multinational companies are exploring (Debswana, n.d.b). Unlike in the 
case of Norway, participation has not led to spillover effects for the rest of the economy. 
Mining is a capital intensive process that generally does not require a lot of high-skilled labor 
and provide few linkages to other sectors (see chapter 3.4). Siphambe (2007) argues that the 
dominance of diamonds in terms of output, government revenue and export, meant that the 
growth of the economy would have to be heavily state-led. The government did not blindly 
follow the liberal policies advocated by the IMF and the World Bank. It chose to only 
liberalize the markets where the private sector was considered to be sufficiently developed. 
 
 
5.3.3. Fiscal policy 
 
Norway 
According to Larsen (2004) Norway has avoided the typical procyclical behavior of resource-
rich countries (see chapter 3.6) since oil production commenced in the 1970s. It has exercised 
fiscal discipline, paid back debts and saved foreign exchange through a resource fund, which 
will be presented in the next chapter. A fiscal rule adopted in 2001, constrain the governments 
non-oil deficit to 4 percent of the resource fund to ensure that resource revenues are saved for 
future generations. This fiscal rule, the so-called “spending rule”, aims to reduce expenditure 
pressure and insulates the budget from oil price volatility by de-linking resource revenues and 
public expenditure (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2007).  
 
The idea behind the fiscal rule is that the spending of oil revenues is equal to the expected 
long run real return of the accumulated financial assets in the resource fund, which is 
estimated to be 4 percent annually. The stable supplement to the budget enables higher public 
spending and lower taxes than what would be possible without petroleum revenues, but 
because only the expected return can be withdrawn, the fund will never be smaller in expected 
terms (Holden, 2013). Deviations which allow for an effective countercyclical fiscal policy 
during recessions are permitted however (IMF, 2007).  
 
According to Holden (2013) the fiscal rule from 2001 has gained broad political support, and 
has so far been followed by the subsequent governments. There is more debate on the way oil 
revenues should be spent. When the spending rule was adopted it was stated that the oil 
revenues should be spent to stimulate economic growth, but there are no explicit restrictions, 
and critics argue that the money is mainly spent on welfare and consumption instead of 
productive investments.  
 
Norway’s petroleum industry is heavily taxed at 78 percent, which ensure that Norway reaps a 
large share of the oil revenues generated.  The high tax rate reflects the high profitability of 
petroleum extraction. Taxation is viewed as stable and transparent however, which increase 
the attractiveness of the Norwegian continental shelf to international oil companies. The 
Norwegian government has also accommodated oil companies by for instance reducing the 
tax rates when the oil price declined in 1986.  
 
Botswana 
According to Siphambe (2007), fiscal policy in Botswana has reflected the prioritization of 
two underlying objectives: sustainable economic growth and diversification of the economy. 
Botswana’s current National Development Plan emphasizes the importance of sustaining 
macroeconomic stability and enhancing Botswana’s competitiveness in global markets 
(Botswana Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 2009).  
 
The country is known for its prudent fiscal policy by de-linking public expenditure from 
revenue and instead establishing saving funds (Lewin, 2011; Meija and Castel, 2012; 
OECD/AfDB, 2013). Acemoglu et al. (2002, p. 2) call Botswana’s fiscal policy “prudent in 
the extreme”. It has managed to avoid the typical procyclical behavior of resource-rich 
countries, exacerbating the volatile commodity cycles and real exchange rate volatility, as 
explained in chapter 3.6. Botswana has avoided unsustainable public expenditure by 
maintaining a fairly constant growth in real expenditures, independent of the real growth of 
government revenue. In 2006 the country established a fiscal rule that restricts government 
spending to 40 percent of GDP (Siphambe, 2007).  
 
Botswana’s public expenditure is not only restricted to avoid procyclical behavior. The 
country also manages the rents from diamond production carefully to achieve sustainable 
development. In order to maintain long-term economic growth, Botswana has recognized that 
revenues from depletion of its non-renewable mineral endowments must be seen as assets 
sales instead of value added in production. The government follows an explicit policy of 
reinvestment of all mineral rents to ensure that consumption can be maintained even after 
mineral reserves are depleted, similar to the Hartwick rule presented in chapter 3.8. Since the 
1980s, the government of Botswana has used the “Sustainable Budget Index” (SBI) to 
monitor how well revenue from mining is reinvested in the national budget (The World Bank, 
2011). In theory, depletion of natural resources can be offset by substituting it with other 
forms of capital that are able to generate the same amount of income. According to Lange 
(2003) Botswana’s government can reinvest mineral revenue in public sector capital 
(infrastructure), human capital (education and health care) and in foreign financial assets. 
According to the Hartwick rule, the national wealth will decline over time if the rents are used 
for public consumption instead. 
 
 
The SBI show the share of non-resource revenue that is spent on public consumption. If SBI 
is below 1, the government can be sure that the Hartwick rule is being followed. 
If SBI < 1: All mineral revenues are used for investment. 
If SBI > 1: Some of the mineral revenues are spent on unsustainable consumption. 
 
Until the mid-1990s the SBI was well below 1, but it has risen slightly above 1 since then 
(Lange, 2003). While the implementation of the SBI may have helped Botswana’s long term 
economic development, Lange and Wright (2004) argue that further examination of the public 
sector capital budget reveals unproductive investments, not able to provide the returns 
necessary to offset resource depletion. 
 
According to OECD/AfDB (2013) Botswana’s tax system is robust and non-distortionary.. A 
vigorous tax administration has ensured that revenue targets have always been surpassed. 
Surveys have found that penalties of non-compliance are administered consistently and that 
they are set high enough to be effective. Tax rates are low compared to other countries in the 
region. There is also mineral tax of 10 percent, mineral royalities of 10 percent of gross 
market value of diamonds and licensing fees (KPMG, 2012). The mineral taxes seem low 
compared to the 78 percent petroleum tax of Norway. 
5.3.4. Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 
Norway 
According to Holden (2013), increased domestic demand from the oil sector combined with 
increased public spending led to a rapid rise in the cost level relative to trading partners in the 
mid-1970s, and a subsequent decline in the traded non-resource sector. To avoid a repetition 
of increase in public spending from rising oil revenues, a government commission suggested 
that revenues from petroleum extraction should be transferred to a resource fund. 
 
Consequently, Norway established a Sovereign Wealth Fund named the Petroleum Fund in 
1990. No money entered the fund until 1996 because a long bust cycle during the early 1990s. 
The name was changed to in the Government Pension Fund Global in 2006, to emphasize the 
objective of saving for the future (Holden, 2013). Investing in foreign financial assets through 
the establishment of the resource fund also served the purpose of sterilizing revenue inflows 
to avoid problematic macroeconomic mechanisms, as explained further in chapter 3. The 
Government Pension Fund Global is the largest Sovereign Wealth Fund in the world. Its value 
at the time of writing is estimated at close to 700 billion US dollars (Norges Bank Investment 
Management, 2014a) 
 
Transfers to the resource fund come from the entire net cash flow from the petroleum sector 
and the return of the fund’s investments. The outflow is the amount needed to cover the non-
oil budget deficits (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2013), which should not exceed 4 percent 
of the funds value. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for the management of the 
Government Pension Fund Global, but the operational management is carried out by the 
central bank, which invests the fund’s capital in bonds and equities outside of Norway in 
accordance with guidelines issued by the Ministry (ibid). The central bank (Norges Bank 
Investment Management, 2014b) states the following with regards to the investment strategy 
of the Government Pension Fund Global: 
 
“The capital is invested abroad, to avoid overheating the Norwegian economy and to shield it 
from the effects of oil price fluctuations. The fund invests in international equity and fixed-
income markets and real estate. The aim is to have a diversified investment mix that will give 
the highest possible risk-adjusted return within the guidelines set by the ministry.”  
 
Management of the fund is accounted for in annual reports to the national assembly, 
“Stortinget”, and in the National Budget (Holden, 2013). In the latest report, the Norwegian 
Ministry of Finance (2014) emphasizes the importance of transparent management of The 
Pension Fund Global. The Ministry states that it “seeks to facilitate a broad-based debate on 
important aspects of the investment strategy of the Fund” (p. 10). The management of the 
resource fund has is often hailed as a good example for other nations. Behrents (2010) finds a 
high level of compliance to the Santiago Principles, which is a set of 24 guidelines for high 
standards of governance, transparency and accountability by sovereign wealth funds. 
 
Botswana 
Mineral rents not invested in infrastructure or human capital, are managed by the central 
bank, the Bank of Botswana. Foreign exchange reserves in excess of what is used by the 
central bank to provide a buffer against short term fluctuations are transferred to the Pula 
Fund, which is Botswana’s Sovereign Wealth Fund. The Pula Fund is used for investments in 
long term assets to achieve high returns (Kojo 2010, as cited in Meija and Castel, 2012).  
 
The Pula fund was established in 1994 and serves two functions: to help stabilize the 
economy and to be a savings fund for future generations. Previous fiscal surpluses are saved 
in the Government Investment Account, which can be used to finance fiscal deficits typically 
experienced during commodity price bust cycles. Resource revenues are invested in the 
Intergenerational Equity Fund, which is the portion of the Pula Fund that seeks to benefit 
future generations (Meija and Castel, 2012). Siphambe (2007) and Meija and Castel argue that 
the Pula Fund has been managed transparently and effectively because of Botswana’s strong 
institutions. According to Siphambe the saving of diamond revenue has “achieved at least two 
outcomes: (i) it has avoided the occurrence of severe Dutch disease and (ii) it has avoided 
emergence of white elephant structures” (unproductive, but prestigious projects). Compared 
to the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund, Botswana’s Pula fund seems almost negligible 
however, currently valued at around 6.9 billion US dollars. (SWF Institute, n.d.a). 
 
5.3.5. Monetary policy 
 
Norway 
The Norwegian government has pursued an inflation target for monetary policy. The central 
bank’s objective is to keep inflation low and stable at an annual CPI increase of 2.5 percent 
(Norges Bank, 2008). At the same time, monetary policy should contribute to stabilizing 
output and employment developments. Monetary policy seeks to balance these needs against 
each other, when conflict of interest arises (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2007). According 
to Norges Bank (2008), the bank is in a position to intervene in the foreign exchange market 
to influence the value of the currency, but it will normally not use interventions. The 




The monetary policy of Botswana uses an inflationary target. According to Linah Mohohlo, 
Governor of Bank of Botswana, maintaining inflation at low, predictable and sustainable 
levels has been a key objective for the central bank for many years (Mohohlo, 2008). 
Botswana’s current National Development Plan (Botswana Ministry of Finance and 
Development Planning, 2009, p. 63) state that: 
 
“The principal objective of monetary policy, which is implemented by the Bank of 
Botswana, is to prevent inflation from moving outside a target range, currently between 3 and 
6 percent. This range is considered to be consistent with achieving maximum sustainable 
economic growth”.  
 
Botswana has fixed exchange rate regime. Mohohlo claims that achieving and maintaining 
price stability has been challenging for the Bank of Botswana. The domestic economy is small 
and open, which means it is very susceptible to external inflationary shocks like rising food 
and oil prices. As mentioned in chapter 3.9 a fixed exchange rate helps the central bank to 
keep inflation at low rates.  
 
According to Botswana Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (2009, p. 61) “it is 
extremely important for the diversification of the Botswana economy that there should be a 
competitive exchange rate.” Initially the currency of Botswana, the pula, was pegged against 
the US dollar. However, this was changed after the country experienced a sharp loss of 
competitiveness when the South African rand depreciated against the dollar, and thereby the 
pula as well (Frankel, 2010). South Africa is Botswana’s main trading partner and more than 
80 percent of merchandise imports come from the neighbor to the south. Nearly all tradable 
goods and services have to compete with imports from South Africa because of the low trade 
barriers in The South African Customs Union, which Botswana is part of (Botswana Ministry 
of Finance and Development Planning, 2009). To ensure a stable, competitive environment 
for the local industry, the pula is now pegged to the rand (Frankel, 2010). Acemoglu et al. 
(2002) find that the exchange rate has remained closely tied to fundamentals. 
 
 






Ghana’s President John Mahama has recently emphasized the importance of reducing reliance 
on the country natural resources; gold, cocoa and oil (Blas, 2014). A new law regulating the 
distribution of oil revenue aims to ensure that the profits from oil extraction are spent on 
broad investments. Too strong focus on the oil sector can be detrimental to other sectors like 
the large agriculture sector which employs more than half of the Ghanaian workforce. 
Examinations of government expenditure show that investment of oil revenues has not been 
distributed according to the law however (Borowski, 2013).  
 
Before oil production commenced, Ghana’s economy was dependent on three traditional 
commodities; gold, cocoa and timber, which accounted for more than ¾ of export revenues 
(United Nations Statistics Division 2009, as cited in Moss and Young, 2009). The growing oil 
revenues adds to the export base, but the economy remains dependent on volatile 
commodities. Crude oil production contributed to 6.8 percent of GDP in 2012, more than 
cocoa and gold combined (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013). The revised GDP for 2013 show 
increase to 8.1 percent (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014). 
 
According to President Mahama (Blas, 2014), the government is trying to diversify through 
downstream linkages within the resource sector, similarly to what Norway did to the oil 
industry. Mahama want to give cocoa traders incentives to process more cocoa beans 
domestically into cocoa powder for chocolate production, instead of simply exporting raw 
materials. The government is also trying to ensure that value is added to gold production by 
refining more domestically instead of exporting gold in bulk. Successful implementation of 
such policies can cause spillover effects for the broader economy. 
 
According to a report from The Mitchell Group (2009), the government of Ghana has spent a 
high amount of resources on education relative to its income. Ghana has also received 
foreign aid targeted to support basic education. Education reforms have been targeted 
towards expanding enrollment for decades. Despite the large investments in human capital, 
Ghana score low in cross-national educational comparisons, even compared to countries of 
the same income level. Private schools consistently outperform public schools. The lack of 
achievements can be attributed to the difficulty of supporting basic education for all, while at 
the same time providing high educational quality. Out of the 148 countries compared in the 
latest Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum, 2014), Ghana scores 122 in 
“Health and Primary Education” and 108 in “Higher Education and Training”.  
 
Venezuela 
In 1998, oil exports accounted for 31 percent of fiscal revenues and 64 percent of total export 
revenues (Rodriguez et al., 2012). Data from The World Bank (n.d.d) show that by 2013 these 
numbers had increased to 50 percent of fiscal revenues and 96 percent of export. The 
petroleum sector accounted for around 25 percent of GDP (OPEC, n.d.). As a result the 
Venezuelan economy is extremely vulnerable to international oil price fluctuations.  
 
Government attempts to diversify the economy away from oil in the 1970s and 1980s was 
largely unsuccessful and instead caused low competitiveness in domestic industries and a 
prolonged economic recession, as chapter 5.2 mentions. Coronel (2008) states that the project 
called “The Great Venezuela” poured oil revenues “into industrial projects designed to 
convert southern Venezuela into another Ruhr. At one point, the country was home to more 
than 300 state-owned companies, none of which was profitable.” According to Auty (2009) 
70 percent of manufacturing investments during the oil boom in the late 1970s went to 
expanding the steel and aluminum industry in the southern Venezuela. As previously 
mentioned however, mining is a capital intensive industry like oil, so the large investments 
created few job. Additional rents were therefore used to increase employment in the public 
sector (Karl 1997, as cited in Auty, 2009), which fueled the unsustainable level of 
consumption further. 
 
Since the government controlled the petroleum resources, and thereby most of the foreign 
currency for imports, both public and private production became dependent on the 
government (Rossi, 2011). Rossi argues that the heavy interference of the current regime have 
further repressed virtually all sectors by scaring off investors.  Chavez’s “productive 
socialism” has led to a collapse in production in both agriculture and manufacturing, and even 
in the petroleum sector. 
 
An article by Muhr and Verger (2006), focus on reforms aimed at providing higher education 
all. Free education became an institutional right under Chavez’s presidency. Evidence of the 
government’s commitment to accumulate human capital is shown by an increase in the 
education budget by 288 percent between 2001 and 2005. Education accounted for around 15 
percent of total government spending in 2006. The central objective of the commitment to 
achieve higher education for all is to develop “integral and sustainable human development” 
and to increase equality by including those who historically have not been able to afford 
higher education. Muhr and Verger note that fractions of Venezuela’s middle and upper 
classes claim that the great expansion of higher education will decrease the quality. This 
debate is similar to that of Ghana. While Ghana aims to provide basic education for all its 
citizens, the emphasis on education is taken a step further to include university level education 
in Venezuela.  
 
According to Rodriguez et al., (2012) Chavez’s regime also implemented other social 
programs or “Misiones”, which are aimed at improving a wide range of areas like education, 
job-training, health and agriculture. however, these expenditures are inefficient and prone to 
corruption. Moreover, “the discretionary distribution of resources via Misiones has allowed 
the government to favor supporters and punish dissent” (p. 19). 
 
 
5.4.2. Government involvement in the resource sector 
 
Ghana 
Since the new oil discovery, a new legislation has been passed to ensure that Ghanaian 
companies secure a share in the oil industry. The legislation indicates the government’s desire 
to keep control of the resources, and make sure that Ghana will benefit from the petroleum 
extraction through participation. Ghanaian companies will be secured a 5 percent share in oil 
production and the supply network initially (Borowski, 2013). The document, called “Local 
Content and Local Participation in Petroleum Activities - Policy Framework”, states that the 
government will seek increase participation gradually, with vision of at least 90 percent 
participation in all aspects of the oil and gas value chain by 2020 (Kuzu and Nantogmah, 
2010).  
 
This strategy is similar to that of Norway (see chapter 5.3.5), which petroleum reserves is also 
found offshore. The initial development is being led by international companies to minimize 
cost and risk posed by involvement of underqualified Ghanaian companies. By securing 
government control and domestic participation, Ghanaian companies can accumulate 
competence before being given increasingly important roles. By implementing this strategy, 
the government hope that increased capabilities can bring positive spillover effects to other 
sectors. A degree of 90 percent participation is much higher than in Norway however. 
Considering the relative lack of human capital, financial constraints and little experience in 
petroleum extraction, this target seems too optimistic. 
 
Venezuela 
Venezuela’s constitution states that the oil belongs to the state (Rossi, 2011). According to 
EIA (2012b) the oil industry was nationalized in the 1970s with the creation of the State 
owned oil and gas company Petroleos de Venezuela S.A (PdVSA). During the 1990s the 
petroleum sector was liberalized, but since Hugo Chaves came to power in 1998 government 
participation have increased again. From 2006 new regulations mandated a minimum 60 
percent share to PdVSA in in all new and existing oil projects. While most international oil 
companies complied with the new terms, Eni and Total were forcibly taken over. Rossi (2011) 
finds examples of government involvement that have led to loss of productivity:  
 
In 2010, the government expropriated almost 200 companies in in key sectors like steel, 
cement, electricity, communications, food and petroleum. Most of them were productive and 
paid taxes, but after the government acquired them, production collapsed and the companies 
now need to be subsidized. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the “productive socialism” 
implemented in 1998 has discouraged investments, and thereby repressed production in a 
wide range of economic sectors, including petroleum. This seems particularly problematic, 
considering that the majority of Venezuela’s enormous petroleum reserves are extra-heavy 
(see chapter 2.4). Heavy crude oil is difficult and expensive to extract, which means foreign 
investments and expertise will be vital to be able to increase production. 
 
 
5.4.3. Fiscal policy 
 
Ghana 
Ghana’s fiscal policy in 2012 and 2013 has been expansionary. This has created large fiscal 
deficits and increasing debt. Economic growth has been declining recent years, but it still 
remains high. Real GDP growth was down to 7 percent in 2013 and is estimated to 5 percent 
in 2014 (Granado and Daal, 2014). The fiscal deficit was 11.5 percent in 2012 and 10.5 
percent in 2013.  
 
Republic of Ghana Ministry of Finance (2014) states that the fiscal deficits are caused by 
several factors: a shortfall in tax revenue due to lower domestic output and import levels, a 
temporary energy crisis and falling commodity prices, most notably gold and cocoa. There 
has also been a large increase in the government wage bill, and increasing interest payments 
on debt. High growth rates during the last decade have caused Ghana to be categorized as a 
lower-middle income country. The increased status has ironically caused an adverse effect as 
the country face reduced foreign aid and access to grants and concessional financing. 
 
Fiscal policy aims to achieve sustainable fiscal deficits and public debt in during the next 
years. A gradual reduction to 6 percent deficit is targeted by 2016. The government seeks to 
reduce the fiscal deficits by rationalization of public expenditure and enhancing tax revenues. 
These deficits can be defended from as procyclical expenditure due to low commodity prices, 
but according to the theory from chapter 3.6 deficits should be avoided when the commodity 
cycle changes and oil revenues increase. An increased government wage bill can cause 
unsustainable levels of public consumption which can be difficult to reverse within a short 
timeframe and cause debt overhang.  
 
Gyampo (2010) claims that revenue collection is a major challenge for Ghana’s oil 
management. The government has previously lacked capacity to collect revenues and audit 
payments from gold mining companies (The World Bank 2008, as cited in Gyampo, 2010) 
and oil accounting is much more complex than mining. Moss and Young (2009) find that that 
the capacity of the government to collect taxes has increased however, as government revenue 
from taxes has increased from 12% of GDP in 1990 to 24% in 2005. Increased taxation can 
also be seen as a sign of growing social contract between citizens and the government, which 
is beneficial for resource dependent countries because resource rents tend to diminish the 
governments accountability to its citizens, as the chapter 3.6 explains.  
 
Ghana’s Petroleum Revenue Management Bill defines the distribution of oil revenues. The 
bill includes a transparent formula for the transfer of oil revenue to the national budget, and 
prohibits use of petroleum reserves as collateral for public debts. It also regulates the amount 




Fiscal policy in Venezuela seems to exemplify the policies not to follow for resource-rich 
countries. Auty (2009) explains how procyclical spending of resource rents and unsuccessful 
fiscal policies caused Venezuela to fall into a resource curse: The 1974-1978 and 1979-1981 
oil booms boosted consumption through subsidized prices and lower taxes on income and 
expenditure, and as mentioned, the government invested large amounts in the steel and 
aluminum industry. Instead of saving some of the resource rents during the boom periods, 
Venezuela accumulated foreign debt. When the economy became overheated the government 
opted to price controls and subsidies instead of reducing public consumption. The result was 
that producers lowered supply because of low profit margins, and economic growth declined. 
Moreover, poor project management delayed start-up of metal plants. This caused them to be 
technologically outdated and less competitive, and unable to service their debt. Auty states 
that “little non-oil tradable activity was competitive by 1981” (p. 38).  
 
During the next decades, successive governments have failed to constrain public expenditure, 
and Auty claims that the electoral cycle has undermined stabilization policies further. In 1989 
the elected government attempted to tighten fiscal policy, which caused high unemployment 
and political instability, and was followed by two failed military coups in 1992, the first led 
by Hugo Chavez. Teodoro Petkoff (2011, as cited in Rossi, 2011, p. 15) finds a “formidable 
expansion” of highly unproductive public expenditure under Hugo Chavez as well. He states 
that “highly unproductive expenditure, translated into a widening of demand and consumption 
and attended by unfettered imports instead of the growth of the internal supply.”  According 
to Ross (2011), imports tripled between 2000 and 2008. Despite high revenues due to 
unusually high oil prices, fiscal deficits have been large and public debt has risen sharply.  
 
Rodriguez et al. (2012) calls Venezuela “a classic example of an oil exporting country with 
substantial resource rents and low taxation. The social contract between the government and 
the citizens of Venezuela declined during the 1970s and 1980s due to the reliance on resource 
revenues, and minimal non-oil taxation (Auty, 2009).  
 
Arezki, Hamilton and Kazimov (2011) compare Norway and Venezuela’s public spending 
with an index of commodity export price between 1970 and 2010. Figure 9 and Figure 10 
show that Venezuela’s spending has been following the export prices, particularly after peaks, 
while Norway’s prudent fiscal policy is evident from the countercyclical spending tracks; 







Figure 9. Government spending in Venezuela. Reprinted from “Resource windfalls, 
macroeconomic stability and growth: The role of political institutions” by R. Arezki, K. 




    
 
Figure 10. Government spending in Norway. Reprinted from “Resource windfalls, 
macroeconomic stability and growth: The role of political institutions” by R. Arezki, K. 
Hamilton and K. Kazimov. 2011, Washington DC: International monetary fund (IMF) 
                  
 
5.4.4. Resource funds 
 
Ghana 
After the discovery of oil, Ghana found it beneficial to set up a Sovereign wealth fund. 
Following debates on how to reap the benefits of the newly discovered oil resources and avoid 
the resource curse that tend to follow, the Ghana Petroleum Funds were founded in 2011. The 
Ghana Petroleum Funds is divided in to Ghana Stabilization Fund (GSF) and Ghana Heritage 
Fund (GHF). GSF was established to support fiscal stability by smoothing out deficits in case 
of unanticipated revenue shortfalls caused by the volatile oil price. GHF is a long term fund 
made to save funds for future generations after the oil reserves are depleted (Ayensu, 2013). 
Roles, responsibilities and operational principles of the sovereign wealth fund are defined in 
the Petroleum and Revenue Management Act 2011 (PRMA) (Chalamish and Opata, 2012). 
 
According to Chalamish and Opata the PRMA gives absolute ownership of the petroleum 
funds to the government of Ghana. Responsibility for investment strategies is given to 
Ghana’s Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, while the operational management is 
conducted by the central bank. An investment advisory committee provides advice to the 
Ministry on investment recommendations which published to enhance transparency. 
Reporting requirements from the PRMA adheres to the guidelines from the Santiago 
Principles. 
 
The allocation of petroleum revenues is guided by the PRMA. According to Ayensu (2013) a 
maximum of 70 percent of benchmark petroleum revenue can be used in the budget. Ayensu 
note that “this predetermined amount is to be approved by parliament as part of the budget 
and should be based on the absorptive capacity of the economy, prudent macroeconomic 
management and the medium/long-term national development plan”. GHF and the GSF 
attract 30 percent and 70 percent, respectively, of the total receipts into the GPFs. Of the 
revenues not included in the “Annual Budget Funding Amount” 70 percent is transferred to 
the GSF and 30 percent to the GHF. Numbers from the 2013 Annual Report on The 
Petroleum Funds presented by Terpker (2013), Ghana’s Minister for Finance, show that 221 
million US dollars have been transfer to the GSF and 95 million to the GHF. Compared to the 
inflows of the largest sovereign wealth funds like that of Norway, the transfers to the Ghana 
Petroleum Funds are still small. The estimated value of the Ghana Petroleum Funds as of 
April 2014 is 450 million US dollars (The Revenue Watch Institute, 2014). 
The Revenue Watch Institute, a New York-based non-governmental organization, has found 
that Ghana Petroleum Funds “feature clear deposit, withdrawal and investment rules, effective 
oversight, and other essential attributes of good governance”. They found that there was still a 
lack of public disclosure of external audits and the detailed responsibilities of fund managers 
and staff, but Ernst & Young have been engaged to conduct an external audit of the funds 
Venezuela 
SWF Institute (n.d.b) states that Venezuela created the Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund 
(FEM) in 1998, following advice from the International Monetary Fund. Inflow to the fund 
mainly comes from profits from the national oil company PdVSA. While the other Sovereign 
Wealth Funds examined in this analysis have been able to accumulate foreign reserves, the 
fund has remained empty and inactive since 2003 (The Economist, 2014). Looking at the 
extremely weak and nontransparent institutions of Venezuela, this is hardly surprising. While 
Norway’s fund has grown to around 150,000 US dollars per citizen, Venezuela has 
accumulated debt equal to 7,000 US dollars per person (ibid). 
 
In 2005, Chavez’s government founded another resource fund Fondo de Desarrollo Nacional 
(FONDEN). According to Plummer (2012) 100 billion US dollars have entered FONDEN 
since then. Pallais (2011) notes that FONDEN operates outside the national budget to fund 
domestic development projects, like highways, schools, factories and hospitals. The fund is 
operated without public scrutiny, and is directly controlled by the president and his closest 
allies. Several sources including, Coronel (2013) and Pallais (2011) claim that FONDEN is 
one of the main channels of corruption in the government. Investigations reveal that nearly 30 
billion US dollars from FONDEN is missing or unaccounted for (Pallais, 2011). 
 
 
5.4.5. Monetary policy 
 
Ghana 
Like in Norway and Botswana, the central bank in Ghana uses an inflation target for its 
monetary policy. The Bank of Ghana (n.d.) states that the objective of monetary policy is to 
ensure price stability through low, stable inflation, and support the government’s objectives 
for economic growth and employment creation. Price stability is defined by the government’s 
inflation target, which is currently below 10 percent annual CPI increase. However, this target 
has not been met recent years. While the inflation has been reduced from around 40 percent in 
year 2000 (Epstein and Heintz, 2006), it is still a problematic feature of the Ghanaian 
economy. According to the Republic of Ghana Ministry of Finance (2014) inflation rose 
during 2013 and has continued to rise up to 14.5 percent in March 2014. The Ministry of 
Finance argues that the increasing inflation is caused by the removal of subsidies on 
petroleum prices and utility tariffs as well as pass-through effects of exchange rate 
depreciation. The stated objectives are similar to those of Norway and Botswana, but the 
inflation target is considerably higher. 
 
Epstein and Henitz (2006) criticize the focus of reducing inflation to low single digits, a 
policy that has been imposed on Ghana by IMF and The World Bank in order to be granted 
funding. Limiting inflation reduce prospects for rapid economic growth and employment 
generation. Epstein and Heintz suggest an alternative monetary policy that focuses more on 
promoting employment. Since the Bank of Ghana uses the short term interest rate to conduct 
monetary policy, the negative impact of increasing the interest rate is problematic. They point 
to several adverse effects of interest rate increases, which are particularly detrimental for a 
country that is struggling with poverty and unemployment. A further discussion of these 
mechanisms is beyond the scope of this thesis however. The most important concern for 
Ghana is perhaps that the high cost of credit. According to The Global Competitiveness report 
2013-2014 (World Economic Forum, 2014) access to financing is by far the most problematic 
factor for doing business in Ghana. Increasing interest rates is a great obstacle for the 
Ghanaian private sector, especially small enterprises (Epstein and Heintz, 2006) 
 
According to Appiah and Adetunde (2011) Ghana’s currency, the cedi, was fixed to the 
British pound before the government pegged it to the US dollar in 1966. Since 1986 the 
exchange rate policy of the Bank of Ghana has been a managed floating exchange rate. Fiscal 
deficits and high inflation cause losing competitiveness and signal weak fundamentals of the 
economy, which has led the cedi to depreciate heavily. The cedi lost 25 percent of its value 




Expansionary monetary policy conducted to reduce fiscal deficits (El Universal, 2013) has 
contributed to high inflation rates, among the highest in the world. The annual rate rose to 
57.3 percent in February 2014 (Reuters, 2014).  
 
Venezuela has maintained a fixed exchange rate, where the currency, the bolivar, is pegged to 
the currency of its most important trading partner; USA. The official bolivar to dollar 
exchange rate was devaluated from 4.29 to 6.29 in 2013 (Hanke, 2013). Hanke estimates that 
even after the devaluation, the bolivar was still overvalued by 74 compared to the black 
market exchange rate. To fight inflation the government of Venezuela purse intense price 
control. This policy is unsustainable and problematic however, as price constraints leads to 
squeezed producer margins and thereby reduced output (Auty, 2009). Christensen (2013) state 
that “the high level of inflation combined with insane price controls have led to massive food 
and energy shortages in Venezuela in recent years.”  
 
The central banks’ inability to maintain price stability is another outcome of the excessive 
expenditure. Printing more currency to cover deficits is arguably not a sustainable solution to 
cover fiscal deficits, but the weak institutions undermine long term progress as previously 
explained. The economic situation with high inflation and increasing debt is unlikely to 
improve under the current regime. A regime change will neither bring any more benefits 
unless the ruling elite is given incentives pursue countercyclical policies. 
 
 
5.5.   Recommendations for Ghana and Venezuela 
 
5.5.1. Policy lessons from Norway and Botswana 
 
Which of the economic policies that have been successfully implemented in Norway and 
Botswana should Ghana and Venezuela adopt in order to escape the resource curse? 
 
The answers to this research question are tied to institutional features discussed in the 
previous chapter. Country specific solutions are necessary to study because of different 
national issues, and varying institutions that affect the ability of countries to successfully 
implement and maintain generally advocated policies.  
 
 Building human capital 
Both Norway and Botswana have invested heavily in education. Norway score well in 
worldwide comparisons. Botswana has achieved enormous results compared to an almost 
non-existent educational sector in 1966. Ghana and Venezuela have also spent large sums on 
education, and must continue to prioritize their human capital in order to diversify their 
economies. The focus has been on expanding enrollment however, and the governments need 
to balance the objective of universal education with educational quality. 
 
 Adopt a centralized wage negotiation system 
Norway has succeeded in making manufacturing the wage leader in the labor market, not the 
resource extraction sector. Productivity increases in the manufacturing sector is 
institutionalized as the accepted wage increase ceiling. Ghana and Venezuela should 
encourage large unions of employers and employees in the private sector to consider 
aggregate interests to avoid unsustainable appreciation of wages.  
 
 Accumulate expertise and know-how through domestic participation in the 
resource sector 
Spillover-loss in Norway may have been much lower than in other oil producing countries 
because of accumulation of domestic know-how and expertise in offshore extraction. This 
was achieved by letting experienced international oil companies lead in the beginning. After a 
gradual accumulation of competence, Norwegian firms have been given an increasingly 
important role, both in extraction and supply of inputs. This has spurred important linkages 
from oil to different resource industries and through downstream links to processing 
industries.  
 
Ghana has initiated the same strategy, but with a more ambitious goal of 90 percent 
participation by 2020. The country must ensure that it manages to avoid cost and risks 
associated with giving key roles to underqualified domestic companies. In Venezuela, the 
national petroleum company PdVSA already holds a majority stake in all new and existing oil 
projects. Venezuela has a long history of petroleum production, but it has not enjoyed the 
same productive linkages to the rest of the economy as in the case of Norway. As foreign 
companies are discouraged from investments by the heavy government intervention in the 
petroleum sector, transfer of knowledge from international companies to the domestic 
industry will be limited. This may be particularly concerning because the majority of 
Venezuela’s oil reserves is difficult and expensive to extract.  
 
 Countercyclical fiscal policy 
Norway and Botswana have exercised prudent fiscal policy during boom cycles by paying 
back debts and saving foreign exchange through resource funds. Resource revenues must be 
de-linked from public expenditure to avoid unsustainable levels of public expenditure. Both 
Ghana and Venezuela struggle with fiscal deficits. Ghana faces low revenues from low prices 
on gold and cocoa. When gold and cocoa prices rise and oil revenues increase it will be 
important that Ghana follows the prudent fiscal management of Norway and Botswana. A 
procyclical increase of public consumption during boom cycles will cause dangerous, long 
term effects for the economic development. Venezuela has vastly increased government 
spending during a period of high oil prices, and need to tighten fiscal policy to sustainable 
levels. The electoral cycle may have undermined stabilization policies. 
 
 Increasing revenue through taxation 
This is as emphasized the benefits of a social contract between the government and its citizens 
in resource-rich countries, where citizens forego some rights and income in order to hold the 
government accountable for the provision of public goods and services. Norway’s tax system 
is characterized by high rates, but the oil sector is particularly high taxed to make sure 
Norway reaps a large share of the oil revenues generated. Taxation is viewed as stable and 
transparent however, which increase the attractiveness investments from international oil 
companies. Botswana on the other hand has relatively low tax rates, but a vigorous tax 
administration has ensured that revenue targets have always been surpassed.  
 
Ghana has managed to double tax revenues’ share of GDP between 1990 and 2005. However, 
revenue collection remains a major challenge for Ghana’s oil management. Venezuela has 
also low tax rates. Non-oil taxation is minimal. Increasing tax rates may be necessary to 
restore fiscal balance and achieve sustainable growth. 
 
 Accumulate wealth in a transparently managed fund. 
Accumulated assets can then be used to fuel demand during bust cycles to avoid prolonged 
recessions and debt overhang, save wealth for future generation and easy transition when 
scarce resource become depleted. All the countries in this comparative analysis have 
established Sovereign Wealth Funds, but only Norway and Botswana has been able to 
accumulate significant assets so far. The Norwegian Pension Fund in particular has been 
hailed for its good governance and transparent investments.  
 
Ghana’s newly founded funds are found share these traits, as well as the same structure and 
division of roles as both Norway and Botswana’s funds. The country should ensure that an 
increasing share of resource rents enters the funds as commodity prices increase and 
petroleum production grows. Venezuela’s Sovereign Wealth Fund however, is characterized 
by lack of transparency, and the government has failed to accumulate any assets despite 
enormous oil revenues. The current institutions make it unlikely that this will change without 
large reforms. 
 
 Adopt strict fiscal rules for distribution of resource rents 
Norway has the so-called “spending rule” which aims to reduce expenditure pressure and 
insulate the budget from oil price volatility. The fiscal rule guarantees that the Norwegian 
Pension Fund Global will never be reduced in expected terms. Botswana use a Sustainable 
Budget Index (SBI) based on the Hartwick rule to monitor how well revenue from mining is 
reinvested in the national budget. Resource rents can be invested in public sector capital 
(infrastructure), human capital (education and health care) and in foreign financial assets. By 
substituting all resource rents with productive investments, wealth will theoretically never 
decline.  
 
The Distribution of oil rents in Ghana is guided by legislation, but the majority is allowed to 
supplement the budget. Venezuela’s resource rents are poured into both the ordinary budget 
and FONDEN projects. Both countries need to restrict spending of resource rents, and view 
resource extraction as asset sales rather than value added in production. Resource rents that do 
enter the budget should be invested in capital that is capable of stimulating growth. 
 
 Balancing monetary policy objectives of price stability with high economic 
growth and employment creation. 
Norway and Botswana have successfully managed to maintain a monetary police with a low, 
a low, stable inflation target, while at the same time achieving high grow rates. Norway in 
particular, has been able to keep unemployment low as well. 
 
The Bank of Ghana states the same objectives, but the country has not been able to keep 
inflation equally low. The relative poverty level and infrastructural needs of Ghana, means the 
urgency of rapid economic growth and employment generation is higher than in Norway and 
Botswana. Limiting inflation by increasing interest rates too much will have great high 
consequences for the Ghanaian private sector, which is already struggling with lack of access 
to affordable credit. 
 
Venezuela’s inflation is among the highest in the world and needs to be contained for 
domestic companies to regain international competitiveness. The expansionary monetary 
policy cannot continue. The government needs to reduce fiscal deficits by cutting 
expenditures and raise taxes, instead of expanding the monetary base. Economic growth and 




5.5.2. Social and political reforms necessary to avoid the resource curse 
 
This part seeks to answer the fourth research question: 
- Are social or political reforms needed to avoid the resource curse in these countries? 
 
As presented in the theoretical framework and further discussed in the analysis, institutional 
quality is instrumental for the ability of resource-rich countries to successfully implement and 
maintain policies that promote sustainable growth. Without transparency, accountability and a 
strong rule of law, producers will pursue rent-seeking instead of productive activities and the 
ruling elite will have incentives to increase and maintain power through patronage. 
 
 Ghana 
In light of the newly discovered oil revenues, the maturing democratic government of Ghana 
has implemented policies successfully followed by the likes of Norway and Botswana. 
Institutional quality in Ghana is still weaker than in Norway and Botswana, but developments 
are positive. If the country is able to continue the path of political stability and increase 
transparency further, there should be no need for drastic social or political reforms in order to 
avoid the resource curse. Research shows that presidential regimes are inferior to 
parliamentary democracies in term of promoting growth. The country may therefor benefit 
from adopting a parliamentary democracy instead. Furthermore, the importance of cultural 
differences like Norway’s egalitarian values and Botswana’s traditions of involving the civil 
society, are difficult to determine, but the culture in these countries has undoubtedly 
influenced developments in a positive way. Both Ghana and Venezuela would benefit from 
institutions that reflect such values. 
 
 Venezuela 
Unlike in Ghana, many of the policies suggested to escape the resource curse are unlikely to 
be implemented and maintained because of extremely weak institutions. Equilibrium forces 
will most likely inhibit increased transparency and accountability as regimes maintain power 
through patronage. The underlying incentives of the ruling elite must be changed, so that they 
are aligned with the long term interest of the population.  
 
Similarly to Ghana, Venezuela has a presidential type of democracy. Presidential regimes 
with proportional voting systems are found to be particularly corrupt, as they are associated 
with lack of accountability and dysfunctional policies. Adopting a parliamentary democracy 
with a majority rule voting system, will likely increase institutional quality. As the electoral 
cycle of Venezuela leads to short term policy horizons and unwillingness to reduce public 
expenditure, the prospects for sustainable growth are low. This problem would be solved by 
abolishing democracy. An autocracy brings other negative consequences however, but a 
further discussion of this proposal is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
 
5.5.3. Possible generalizations 
 
Can these findings provide some general guidelines for resource-rich developing countries?  
Although the number of comparative cases in this study is limited to four, it seems evident 
from the literature study, and the comparison of institutions in the four countries, that 
institutional quality must be high to successfully manage resource wealth. This is seen from 
the diverging growth rates and institutional levels of the successfully countries and the 
vulnerable countries, particularly between Norway and Venezuela.  
 
Diversification through investments in human capital and focus on keeping the non-resource  
sectors competitive is important for all resource-rich countries dependent nonrenewable 
resources that will eventually be depleted. The possibility of creating spillover effects to other 
sectors seems largely dependent on the individual characteristics of the resource sector. While 
Botswana has successfully managed its resource rents in most ways, it has not managed to 
create productive linkages between mining and other sector of the economy. Developments in 
the Norwegian offshore industry created technological developments beneficial for both other 
resource sectors and downstream industries, but the mining sector of Botswana do not share 
the same requirements for innovative technologies. 
 
A major finding in this thesis is the importance procyclical government spending, exemplified 
by both Norway and Botswana. Prudent fiscal and accumulation of foreign reserves during 
boom cycles should be applied by all countries dependent on volatile commodity prices. On 
the other hand, a general recommendation for exchange rate policy is difficult to argue for, 
given the seemingly successful management of both a floating exchange rate in Norway and a 





This comparative study has reviewed institutions and economic policies in two countries that 
have successfully managed to avoid the resource curse, and two countries that remain 
vulnerable to the resource curse mechanisms. Norway and Botswana are often hailed as 
examples of countries that have managed their resource wealth well. Previous studies and 
export opinions, as well as survey data, show that institutions of these countries are 
considerable better than those of those of the vulnerable countries; Ghana and Venezuela. 
While Ghana ranks average on the surveys gathered by the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(2013b), Venezuela ranks among the worst in the world in all dimension of good governance, 
particularly in control of corruption, regulatory quality and rule of law. Rossi (2011) 
emphasize that the economic framework is founded on patronage instead of economic 
fundamentals. 
 
All countries have aimed to diversify their economies, but only Norway is found to have some 
success in this area. Larsen (2004) argue that Norway has managed reduce spillover-loss 
effects from accumulation of offshore competencies, it has managed to make the 
manufacturing sector the wage leader and has been able to build high levels of human capital. 
The governments in the four countries have all been strongly involved in the resource sectors, 
but Venezuela is found to have scared off foreign companies through heavy government 
intervention for instance by expropriation of companies in key sectors. 
 
Fiscal policy is found to be countercyclical and very prudent during boom cycles in both 
Norway and Botswana. Venezuela on the other hand, has exemplified bad fiscal management 
by its strong procyclical expenditure, leading to unsustainable public consumption, debt 
overhang, and thereby high vulnerability to falling petroleum prices. All the countries 
compared have established resource funds to stabilize the economy and save for future 
generations. The Norwegian fund is by far the largest, and is praised for transparent 
management. The other countries have not managed to accumulate as much wealth. Ghana’s 
fund is newly established after the discovery of oil reserves, but initial reports by The 
Revenue Watch Institute (2014) claim that it is being managed well. Venezuela’s Sovereign 
Wealth Fund FEM, stands as an example of the government’s failure to promote policies that 
create sustainable growth. According to The Economist (2014) it has been empty and inactive 
since 2003.  
 
Norway, Botswana and Ghana have all pursued a monetary policy of keeping price stability 
through low, stable inflation. They have aimed to maintain a competitive exchange rate tied to 
fundamentals. Despite high oil prices, Venezuela’s monetary policy has been expansionary 
recent years to cover fiscal deficits. Inflation has soared, but instead of devaluating the 
overpriced fixed exchange rate, the government has opted to intense price controls, which 
cause undersupply of domestic goods and services. 
 
The comparative analysis of institutions and policies provides a foundation to suggest lessons 
Ghana and Venezuela can learn from the management of resource revenues in Norway and 
Botswana. Possible solutions are strategies that Norway implemented to diversify its 
economy, procyclical expenditure through prudent fiscal management during boom cycles 
and increased taxation, transparent distribution of resource rents and Sovereign Wealth Funds, 
and monetary policy that balances objectives of price stability with high economic growth and 
employment creation. 
 
Ghana’s management democratic development and resource management recent years, 
suggest that no drastic social or political reforms in order to avoid the resource curse. 
Venezuela on the other hand, needs to change the underlying incentives of the rule elite to 
achieve sustainable growth. While democratic accountability is found to promote good 
economic policies in Norway, Botswana and Ghana, the combination of oil production and 
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